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Abstract 
I examine the effects of firms’ cluster membership on their alliance network structure, and how 
firms’ absorptive capacity moderates the relationship between alliance network structure and 
innovation.  Little is known regarding the inter-relationship between cluster membership, 
network structure and innovation.  This study bridges this gap by first establishing the 
endogenous nature of network structure with respect to cluster membership and then by studying 
the moderating effect of absorptive capacity for the alliance network structure and innovation 
relationship.   
I contribute to the strategic management literature in several important ways.  First, I 
clarify the implications of cluster membership on network structure by including two competing 
explanations: complementary and substitution mechanisms.  Contrary to the popular belief that 
cluster membership does not matter, I find that it does matter in the study of the US 
biopharmaceutical industry.  My findings show that firms’ location within a cluster area does not 
v 
substitute for their strategic choices specifically for their alliance strategies.  Second, I 
theoretically argue and then empirically demonstrate that network structure is an endogenous 
phenomenon with respect to cluster membership.  Third, I demonstrate that when controlled for 
endogeneity with respect to cluster membership, alliance network structure and innovation 
relationship is positively moderated by firms’ absorptive capacity.  In contrast to prior literature, 
I find that the main effect of firms’ structural holes on innovation is not significant when 
controlled for endogeneity.  This finding is important given the mixed findings for structural 
holes and innovation relationship in previous studies.  Finally, to the best of my knowledge, in 
the strategic management literature this study is the first study to introduce an exponential 
regression model with Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimation that accounts for 
both the endogenous nature of independent variables and the count nature of dependent variable. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
A central premise of studies involving geographical clusters is that cluster membership 
influences firms’ strategic choices such as alliance network structure.  Particularly, firms located 
within geographical clusters are purported to have advantages both as an initiator and as a target 
of alliance activities compared to firms that are located outside geographical clusters due to 
economic, cultural, and social benefits associated with cluster membership1 (Saxenian, 1994; 
Porter, 1998; Bagchi-Sen, 2004; Scott, 2004).  Yet approximately 53% of the US firms in the 
biopharmaceutical industry are headquartered outside a biopharmaceutical cluster and they do 
not appear to be significantly disadvantaged.  On average, out-cluster firms are more productive 
than in-cluster firms (approximate sales per employee for out-cluster firms is 0.3 MM vs. 0.2 
MM).  I explore these conflicting conjectures as it relates to the relationship between cluster 
membership, research and development alliance network structure, the moderating role of 
absorptive capacity, and innovation.  
My reasoning is that strategic choices involving the design of an alliance network 
structure are not random decisions.  Firm attributes affect firms’ alliance choices regarding with 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, the terms cluster membership, in-cluster, and location within a cluster are used 
interchangeably.  
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whom to form alliance with, leading to an endogenous nature of alliance network structure 
(Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999).  These strategic choices are based on firm specific attributes such as 
cluster membership because firms’ strategic choices are influenced and constrained by their 
geographic location (Birkinshaw, Braunerhjelm, Holm, and Terjesen, 2006; Scott, 2004; 
Sorenson and Baum, 2003; Porter, 1998).   I study one such strategic choice, alliance network 
structure because firms’ positions in their alliance network structure affect firms’ innovation 
(Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Ahuja, 2000; Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997).  Therefore, 
taking the endogenous nature of alliance network structure with respect to cluster membership 
into account changes both the theoretical and empirical lens for examining the alliance network 
structure and innovation relationship.   
While both cluster membership defined as geographic location within a cluster area and 
alliance network structure have significant innovation outcomes (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; 
Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 1999; Chacar & Lieberman, 2003; Ahuja, 2000; Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2004), studying the influence of cluster membership on alliance network structure and 
accounting for its endogenous impact on network structure, absorptive capacity, and innovation 
relationship has important theoretical and empirical consequences.  If firms’ strategic choices are 
endogenous with respect to a certain firm attribute such as cluster membership then theoretical 
models and empirical methods should mirror these influences and constraints.  Thus, I propose 
that firms’ alliance network structure is an endogenous phenomenon with respect to firms’ 
cluster membership and the endogenous network structure with respect to cluster membership 
influences firms’ innovation based on firm’s absorptive capacity.   
I test my theoretical model by using a longitudinal dataset consisting of a sample of US 
biopharmaceutical firms (SIC 2834) from 1998 to 2004.  The results of this study, first, indicate 
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that contrary to the popular belief that cluster membership does not matter due to advanced 
communication technologies, I find that it does matter in the context of US biopharmaceutical 
industry.  My findings also show that firms’ location within a cluster area does not substitute for 
their strategic choices specifically for their alliance strategies.  Second, my results show that 
alliance network structure is an endogenous phenomenon with respect to cluster membership.  
Third, I find that when controlled for endogeneity with respect to cluster membership, alliance 
network structure and innovation relationship is positively moderated by firms’ absorptive 
capacity.  In contrast to prior literature, additional analysis reveals that the main effect of firms’ 
structural holes on innovation is not significant when controlled for endogeneity.  This finding is 
important given the mixed findings for structural holes and innovation relationship in previous 
studies. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
In this dissertation my objective is to address the following research questions.   
1) What is the effect of cluster membership on firms’ alliance network structure? 
1a) what is the effect of cluster membership on firms’ centrality in their 
alliance networks? 
1b) what is the effect of cluster membership on firms’ structural holes?  
2) How does firms’ absorptive capacity moderate the relationship for endogenous alliance 
network structure and innovation? 
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1.3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND MOTIVATION 
My research is motivated by the following observations from both scholarly research and 
practice.  First, biases arising from endogeneity in business research has been studied from a 
methodological perspective while ignoring substantive theoretical questions (e.g. Douglas, 2006; 
Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Shaver, 1999).  Demonstrating that empirical results may change 
when endogeneity is addressed by using appropriate econometric techniques is different from 
developing theoretical arguments that establish endogeneity in a model.  That is, theoretical 
reasons as to why a given strategic choice is endogenous should also be addressed before 
embarking on using econometric techniques to account for endogeneity in empirical models.   
Second, the economic geography literature has two intellectual streams:  place and space 
arguments (Sorenson & Baum, 2003).  Place arguments state that the strategic actions of firms 
are influenced and constrained by the characteristics of their physical location, such as 
availability of research institutions and scientists (e.g. Furman, 2003).  In contrast, space 
arguments suggest that firms’ strategic actions are influenced by availability of knowledge 
spillovers in a geographical area (e.g. Flyer and Shaver, 2003).  Based on place perspective, or as 
I call it the complementary2 view, cluster characteristics may augment the alliance network 
structure of firms by providing access to cluster resources.  For example, availability of cluster 
resources makes a cluster member an attractive alliance partner for out-cluster firms.   
Alternately, the geography of space, or as I call it the substitution view, suggests that 
knowledge spillovers among firms located in a cluster lessen the need to develop an alliance 
                                                 
2 For clarity, in the literature complementary is also used to denote interaction of two variables.  Here, I use the word 
‘complementary’ simply to represent something that completes one thing or to fill out (Webster, Collegiate 
Dictionary).  
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network structure.  For example, knowledge spillovers in a geographically bounded area 
motivate innovation by increasing firm’s patents (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993; Jaffe & 
Trajtenberg, 1999).  Based on these perspectives, one might argue that cluster membership has a 
dual effect on firms’ alliance network structure.  On the one hand, there is a complementary 
effect that cluster membership promotes and contributes to firms’ alliance network structure.   
On the other hand, there is a substitution effect that cluster membership holds back the 
development or replaces firms’ alliance network structure.  Clarifying the complementary versus 
substitution effect of cluster membership on alliance network structure is important for our 
understanding of cluster membership benefits (or costs) because the design of alliance network is 
a strategic choice with innovation consequences.   
Third, the alliance literature is based on the assumption that alliance network structure 
offers information and control benefits (Koka and Prescott, 2002) and that these are exploited by 
firms (for an exception, see McEvily & Yao, 2005).  Further, according to the absorptive 
capacity literature, firms that have the capabilities to acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit 
external information innovate and have competitive advantage (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra 
& George, 2002; Lane, Koka, and Pathak, 2006).  Therefore, I suggest that firms’ alliance 
network structure affects innovation contingent upon their absorptive capacity.  Put differently, 
alliance network structure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for firms’ innovation.   
Finally, geographic clusters and alliance networks have gained a growing importance 
across industries.  A recent survey conducted by Deloitte Research (2005) demonstrated that 
geographic location of an alliance partner is one of the drivers of alliance formation.  This raises 
a natural question: what factors or firm attributes affect firms’ strategic alliance network 
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structure?  Thus, the impact of cluster membership on firms’ strategic choices, such as on 
strategic alliances, should be further explored.       
Building on these observations, I advance the theoretical as well as the empirical 
understanding of the endogenous nature of firms’ network structure with respect to their cluster 
membership and in turn implications for innovation.  Simply put, I suggest that cluster 
membership affects firms’ R&D alliance network structure leading to an endogenous alliance 
network structure with respect to cluster membership.  The impact of the endogenous alliance 
network structure on innovation is contingent on firms’ absorptive capacity.   
I draw on economic geography and inter-organizational networks literatures.  The 
economic geography literature suggests that cluster membership has significant innovation 
outcomes (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Porter, 1998; Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 1999; Chacar & 
Lieberman, 2003).  Specifically, it argues that cluster membership affects innovation by 
providing access to resources available in a cluster area or by benefits from knowledge spillovers 
due to co-location.  For the purposes of this study, cluster membership is defined as a geographic 
location of a biopharmaceutical firm’s headquarters (HQ) or R&D-Laboratory in a cluster area.  
Clusters are geographically enclosed areas that include a group of co-located firms tied together 
by economic interdependencies as well as complex social interaction due to proximity which 
also contribute to knowledge sharing (Porter, 1998a; Tallman et al. 2005).   
Similar to prior research, I focus on two aspects of alliance network structure: degree 
centrality and structural holes.  Degree centrality indicates how active a firm is in its alliance 
network structure by examining the number of its alliances.  Structural holes (Burt, 1992) 
represent the lack of connections among a focal firm’s partners.  A focal firm spans many 
structural holes if its partners do not have alliances with each other.  In order to have a better 
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understanding of firms’ network position in their R&D alliance networks I include firms’ entire 
set of alliances with both in-cluster and out-cluster firms.  
1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.4.1 Research Context and Data  
In order to test the hypotheses developed in this dissertation I use a panel dataset of 147 US 
biopharmaceutical firms.  My dataset includes information on firms’ geographical location, R&D 
alliance network structure, absorptive capacity, firm size and age, and innovation-patents granted 
for the period from 1998 to 2004.  I collected data from multiple sources.  First, using the 
Mergent Online, Compustat, and Thomson databases I identified public companies that designate 
their primary business as pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834).  Second, I relied on Mergent 
online, Compustat, Edgar database, and company websites in order to gather geographic location 
data that includes both headquarters and R&D facilities location.  Since geographical clusters are 
identified based on metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and MSAs are defined to include 
counties, I also had to identify counties that firms in my sample are located.  County and MSA 
information were obtained from the US Census bureau.  Third, data on R&D alliances were 
obtained from Recombinant Capital (Recap), a private database that tracks and analyzes alliances 
including biopharmaceutical firms.  Validity of alliance data has also been checked against 
Thomson Financial Security Data Company’s alliance database (SDC).   
My study focuses on the biopharmaceutical industry (SIC 2834) because both clustering 
and alliance networks have been shown to influence firms’ innovation in this sector (Arora and 
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Gambardella, 1990; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Powell, et al., 1999; McKelvey et al., 2003; 
Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004).  The complexity of biopharmaceutical products contributes to 
rising financial costs and an increase in time spent on development.  These two factors have led 
to increased dependency on R&D alliances.  The number of alliances, particularly R&D 
alliances, has grown tremendously over the last five years in the biopharmaceutical sector.  
According to the Deloitte Research on alliance formation the total value of new alliances 
including only pharmaceutical and biotech companies has grown from $6 billion in 1999 to $11 
billion in 2004.  In addition, this sector is among the fastest growing industries in the US, the 
inflation adjusted biopharmaceutical industry output is expected to increase from $69.2 billion in 
2004 to $128.3 billion in 2014 (Milken Institute Fact Sheet, 2004). 
1.4.2 Econometric Analysis 
I tested my hypotheses by using multiple econometric techniques.  My analysis includes two 
stages.  In the first stage, I test the theoretical relationship between cluster membership, 
centrality and structural holes variables (Hypotheses 1 and 2) by a random effects negative 
binomial model.  I test hypothesis 2 (cluster membership-structural holes relationship) by using 
random effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression.  
In the second stage, to test the moderating effect of absorptive capacity for the centrality- 
innovation and structural holes innovation hypotheses (hypotheses 3 and 4) I employ an 
exponential instrumental variable regression due to the endogenous nature of my independent 
variables.  Particularly, I use a fixed effects model with General Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation.  I use the fixed effects model in an exponential form because my dependent variable 
(patent) is a count variable (Cincera, 1997).  
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1.4.3 Results 
The findings of this study show support for the overall research model.  In hypotheses 1a-b, I 
propose competing predictions for the effect of firms’ in-cluster location on their central position 
in their alliance network structure.   The results of analysis support hypothesis 1a that firms’ in-
cluster location when measured by HQ location is positively associated with being more central 
in their R&D alliance network structure compared to firms located elsewhere.  That is, in-cluster 
location complements firms’ central position in their alliance networks structure.  Similar to 
hypothesis 1, hypotheses 2a-b also proposed competing explanations for the in-cluster location 
and structural holes relationship.  The results support hypothesis 2a, that in-cluster firms span 
more structural holes in their R&D alliance networks than firms located elsewhere.  Similar to 
hypothesis 1a, in-cluster location complements firms’ structural holes in their alliance network 
structures.  The significant findings for Hypothesis 2 (cluster membership and structural holes 
relationship) indicate that having a headquarters (or at least one R&D-Lab) within a cluster leads 
to higher structural holes compared to firms that do not have headquarters (or at least one R&D-
Lab) within cluster.  Similar to arguments in hypothesis 1, in-cluster firms have structural holes 
advantage, which brings in information diversity.   
The second stage of the analysis includes results of hypotheses 3 and 4.  In hypothesis 3, 
I predict that firms’ absorptive capacity positively moderates the centrality and innovation 
relationship.  Coefficient of the interaction variable (0.001), centrality X absorptive capacity 
provides support for hypothesis 3, that the interaction between firms’ absorptive capacity and 
centrality is positive and significant.  This indicates that based on firms’ absorptive capacity 
central firms innovate more than other firms when endogeneity of centrality is controlled with 
HQ location.  In support of hypothesis 4, which predicts that firms’ absorptive capacity 
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positively moderates the relationship between firms’ structural holes and innovation, the results 
of fixed effects model with GMM estimation indicate a significant relationship.  Thus, 
hypothesis 4 is supported when I account for endogeneity by HQ location variable. 
1.5 CONTRIBUTION  
According to the inter-organizational networks literature, several aspects of alliance network 
structure such as centrality and structural holes influence firm innovation.  For the centrality and 
innovation relationship prior research has shown both a direct relationship and a contingent 
relationship based on cluster membership.  Ahuja (2000) and Walker, Kogut, and Shan (1997) 
found that there is a direct positive relationship between centrality and the innovation output due 
to high level of information sharing and complimentary skills among partners.  Based on the 
contingency perspective, Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004 found that centrality in a geographically 
bounded network has no effect while centrality in a dispersed network has positive effect on 
innovation.  
As for the effect of structural holes on innovation, the outcome of research has been 
mixed.  On the one hand, a negative relationship has been presented because structural holes 
inhibit development of trust among partners leading to moral hazard problems.  This hinders 
knowledge sharing among partners, affecting innovation negatively (Ahuja, 2000).  On the other 
hand, a positive relationship between structural holes and innovation has been presented by 
Hargadon and Sutton (1997).  Their study showed that firms exploit their positions as a spanner 
of structural holes in order to innovate.   
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My conception of the relationship between cluster membership, inter-organizational 
alliance networks and innovation differs in several ways from prior research.  First, in contrast to 
previous studies (Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994; Ahuja, 2000; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; 
Bell, 2005) by identifying cluster membership as an antecedent to firms’ alliance network 
structure, my framework explicitly incorporates alliance network structure as an endogenous 
phenomenon.  Both theoretical and empirical model specifications have limited prior studies’ 
ability to account for the endogenous nature of alliance network structure in an inclusive model 
that also incorporates innovation implications.  This follows the approach in the strategy 
literature where a performance variable is regressed on a strategic choice variable.  However, this 
empirical approach does not account for endogenous nature of strategic choice and the estimated 
coefficients may not reveal valid relationship between independent and dependent variables 
(Shaver, 1998).  Similarly, previous research on clusters includes the resources and resource mix 
associated with clusters but do not focus on how firms’ location within clusters affects their 
alliance networks thereby firms’ innovation (Porter, 1998; Porter, 2003; Saxenian, 1994).  By 
incorporating an inclusive theoretical and an empirical model that examines cluster membership, 
alliance network structure, and innovation, I provide new insights for understanding the 
theoretical arguments as well as empirical reasons behind the endogenous nature of alliance 
network structure with respect to firm attribute.  
Second, my approach is not limited to one geographic location or a cluster.  I include the top 12 
cluster areas identified as biopharmaceutical clusters in the US.  Including, the top 12 clusters 
allows for regional diversity which may affect firms’ network structure.  By regional diversity I 
mean variation in resources associated with clusters. These include resources associated with 
both place (such as existence of other firms, research institutions) and space (such as knowledge 
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spillovers).  Third, in contrast to prior studies in which only alliances among firms in the same 
industry are taken into consideration (Ahuja, 2000) I take the complete alliance network structure 
of biopharmaceutical firms.  Put differently, my alliance network is not limited to a single 
industry network but rather it includes the entire set of alliances a biopharmaceutical firm has 
established.  These may include, but are not limited to, alliances among firms in the same 
industry.  This approach provides a better understanding of a firm’s position in the entire alliance 
network structure.  That is, my alliance network includes not only the direct ties but also the 
indirect ties a firm has in its entire network.  This is important because both direct and indirect 
network ties act as conduits of information among network actors (Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2004). 
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
My framework has two main arguments.  First, I argue that cluster membership defined as firms’ 
geographic location within a cluster area affect alliance network structure by means of two 
mechanisms: a complementary mechanism and a substitution mechanism.  As shown in the 
cluster membership- innovation relationship in Figure 1, I theoretically establish the endogenous 
nature of alliance network structure with respect to firms’ cluster membership.  Second, given 
the endogenous nature of alliance network structure with respect to firm’s cluster membership I 
examine the implications of alliance network structure for innovation contingent on firms’ 
absorptive capacity.  Following prior literature I suggest a contingent view on alliance network 
structure and innovation relationship.  Similar to Tsai (2001) I suggest absorptive capacity 
moderates the effect of alliance network structure on firms’ innovation because if firms have not 
developed the capabilities for acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and commercialization of 
new information they are unlikely to translate alliance network structure benefits into innovation.   
Cluster membership defined as the geographic location of firms’ within a cluster area is 
important, because the geographical location of firms affects their strategic choices.  In 
particular, proximity of firms to key customers, suppliers and other research institutions provide 
strategic benefits (Birkinshaw et. al., 2006).  Extending the social network theory to inter-
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organizational network framework one may argue that the proximity of top executives to key 
customers or suppliers may promote strong interpersonal relationships which in turn influence 
firms’ performance (Granovetter, 1973).  Although scholars from economic geography and inter-
organizational network literature have long studied the relationship between cluster membership 
and innovation, as well as alliance network structure and innovation respectively, most research 
in this tradition has largely focused on cluster membership or alliance network structure as 
independent predictors of innovation.  The economic geography literature suggests that cluster 
membership is a predictor of innovation in two ways.  First, firms located in clusters that provide 
complementary inputs realize greater innovative productivity (Feldman, 2000).  Second, 
innovation as measured in R&D expenditures, number of R&D-Laboratories in a cluster, or 
number of R&D employees is an outcome of knowledge spillovers in a cluster area (Feldman, 
1994, 2002; Aharonson, Baum, and Feldman, 2004).  However, the economic geography 
literature does not focus on how the endogenous alliance network structure with respect to firm 
attributes affects firms’ innovation.     
Noting alliance network structure and innovation relationship as demonstrated in Figure 
1, the inter-organizational networks literature presents alliance network structure as a predictor 
of innovation (Shan, Walker, and Kogut, 1994; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004).  This research 
has focused on using a network approach in explaining innovation generation (Ahuja, 2000).  
Nevertheless, it does not examine the endogenous nature of alliance network structure with 
respect to firm attributes, particularly cluster membership.  This conceptionalization of the role 
of cluster membership or alliance network structure on innovation raises two issues.   
First, the literature on how cluster membership is linked to innovation has provided 
competing explanations.  One view suggests that in-cluster firms innovate because they have 
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access to tangible cluster resources such as labor pool, and financial resources (Saxenian, 1994).  
This suggests that cluster resources augments firms’ strategic choices such as inter-firm alliances 
and thus in-cluster firms are more innovative.  I call this view the complementary view.   An 
alternate view suggests that in-cluster firms are more innovative because there are free 
knowledge spillovers and firms take advantage of spillovers (Jaffe, 1989; Feldman, 1994b).  
These spillovers are substitutes for firms’ strategic choices such as alliance formation that might 
lead to innovation.  I call this view the substitution view.   
Second, both the theoretical and empirical study of alliance network structure and 
innovation relationship is based on the assumption that alliance network structure as a strategic 
choice is not constrained by firm attributes.  Yet, strategic choices are constrained as they are 
based on firm attributes and external conditions (Shaver, 1998).  Thus, the empirical implication 
of alliance network structure on innovation changes, once the endogenous nature of network 
structure with respect to firm attributes is accounted for both theoretically and empirically.  This 
may result in a change in the size and direction of coefficients in an empirical model that 
includes innovation as a dependent variable.   
The issues raised above have several important implications for my framework linking 
cluster membership, alliance network structure, and innovation.  First, my theoretical arguments 
include alternate explanations regarding the impact of cluster membership on alliance network 
structure.  Second, I establish endogenous nature of alliance networks structure with respect to 
firm attribute of cluster membership by recognizing the impact of cluster membership on alliance 
network structure.  Finally, I posit that firms must have developed necessary capabilities in place 
in order to exploit benefits brought in by their positions in alliance network structure.  
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Differently put, firms’ absorptive capacity moderates the relationship between endogenous 
alliance network structure with respect to cluster membership and innovation.   
Based on prior literature I identify two aspects of network structure that are explained by 
complementary and substitution mechanisms in connection with cluster membership.  (1) 
Centrality: The numbers of alliances firms have in their alliance networks, and (2) structural 
holes: the lack of connections between focal firm’s partners.  Degree centrality is relevant for the 
context of this study because it provides information volume benefits for innovation.  Structural 
holes provide information diversity benefits, which are also associated with firm innovation in 
the literature (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Ahuja, 2000).  Simply put, I argue that cluster 
membership affects the centrality of firms and structural holes they span in their alliance network 
structure by means of two alternate mechanisms: a complementary mechanism and a substitution 
mechanism.  Alliance network structure, in turn, influences innovation performance contingent 
on firms’ absorptive capacity.  A summary of hypothesized relationships in the study is provided 
in Table 1. 
2.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.2.1 Cluster Membership and Alliance Network Structure 
2.2.1.1 Cluster membership and centrality 
Firms are more central in their alliance networks when they are involved in a large number of 
alliances with other organizations (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  There are two main theoretical 
perspectives that provide alternative explanations for the relationship between cluster 
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membership and centrality:  complementary view and substitution view.  Based on the 
complementary view, firms located within a cluster area become more central in their alliance 
networks while substitution view suggests that in-cluster firms have less of a need to be central 
in their alliance networks.    
According to the complementary view,  a firm’s in-cluster location affects its number of 
alliances thereby its centrality by means of three mechanisms:  (1) in-cluster firms form alliances 
with other in-cluster organizations due to reduced  transaction and communication costs 
associated with proximate alliance partners (transaction costs); (2) in-cluster firms serve as 
attractive alliance partners for out-cluster firms who need access to cluster resources (resource 
complementarities); and (3) the social networks within a cluster reduce the moral hazard problem 
associated with alliance partners (embeddedness).  
Firms enter into agreements in which the transaction costs are at a minimum 
(Williamson, 1975).  Physical proximity facilitates inter-firm cooperation (Dyer, 1996; Enright, 
1995).  Naturally, for in-cluster firms it is less costly to form alliances with other in-cluster 
organizations because of the absence of long distance search, monitoring and formal 
communication costs.  Moreover, firms utilize their local advantages in a manner to maximize 
the performance benefits.  Saxenian (1994) states that Hewlett Packard and other physically 
proximate firms have improved performance by setting up alliances with other firms in the 
Silicon Valley technology cluster.  McKelvey et al. (2003) found that firms are more likely to 
collaborate with co-located organizations than with international ones in the Swedish 
biopharmaceutical sector when they are involved in research and development.  Anecdotal 
evidence also suggests that geographical proximity is important in alliance relationships.  For 
example, an executive from a medical device manufacturing company states that “it is a lot 
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easier to drive across town and visit a supplier than it is to pick up the phone and try to talk 
through some complicated issue” (WSJ, October 26, 2006). 
In-cluster firms have more alliances than out-cluster firms because in-cluster firms are 
attractive alliance partners for out-cluster firms.  First, in-cluster firms have access to cluster 
resources.  For example, factor endowments such as production inputs are localized (Feldman, 
2000).   Second, clusters provide various opportunities for collaboration among universities, 
research-intensive biotechnology firms and large pharmaceutical corporations located within a 
cluster.  Indeed, Arora and Gambardella (1990) state that there are systematic linkages among 
universities, biotechnology firms, and large pharmaceutical corporations.  Kogut et al (1994) 
suggest that firms within a region share both tradable and un-tradable resources such as 
knowledge.  This provides the motive for out- cluster firms to enter into alliances with in-cluster 
firms in order to benefit from these un-tradable resources within clusters.  Aharonson et al. 
(2004) provides evidence that R&D alliances are a complement to in-cluster location.  Bagchi-
Sen (2004) shows that in-cluster firms also initiate alliances with out-cluster firms3.  Third, 
knowledge transfer among in-cluster firms happen in the form of component knowledge transfer 
(Tallman et. al., 2004).  Firms might enter into alliances with other in-cluster firm in order to 
benefit from others’ component knowledge.  Component knowledge in the biopharmaceutical 
industry might include knowledge of drug manufacturing, clinical trials, and new medications for 
certain diseases.  For example, a pharmaceutical company located in a cluster might form an 
alliance with a small biotech company in order to market and sell a new preparation by the 
biotech company.   
                                                 
3 In-cluster firms might enter into alliances from two directions: as initiator of alliance activity and as a target of 
alliance activity. 
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Clusters provide the necessary condition for the development of social networks among 
employees of firms located in one location.  For example, employees working in the cluster areas 
often socialize in the same clubs, their children attend the same schools, and they attend the same 
local events.  Employees’ social networks in a cluster also affect in-cluster firms forming 
alliances with other firms in the same cluster.  Firms entering into alliances face moral hazard 
problems due to uncertainty and the likely costs of opportunistic behavior by partners (Das and 
Teng, 1998).  Social networks help in becoming aware of such moral hazard problems associated 
with partners (Gulati, 1999).  This enables firms to establish alliances with organizations they 
already know from employees’ social networks.  Similarly, Inkpen and Tsang (2005) argue that 
social ties among employees in an industrial district serve as a foundation for formal connections 
among firms in these areas.  Giuliani (2005) argues that business interactions which include any 
business related interactions (e.g. participating in fairs, vertical, horizontal trade of goods, etc.) 
among in-cluster firms and knowledge flows among these firms are not highly co-occurring 
phenomena.   In other words, social interaction among individuals within a cluster area does not 
substitute for formal alliances.  Therefore, firms’ in-cluster location affects the number of 
alliances they form leading to more central positions in their alliance network. 
In contrast, according to the substitution perspective one might expect that in-cluster 
location and having access to resources in a cluster are substitutes for entering into alliances.  
This reasoning paves the way for the spillover mechanism in explaining the relationship between 
in-cluster location and firm centrality.  Spillover arguments suggest that firms benefit from one 
another due to their proximity because resources such as knowledge spillover to other parties and 
there are geographic boundaries to spillovers (Jaffe, 1989; Jaffe et al. 1993; Krugman, 1991; 
Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 1999).  Firms located within a 
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geographically close group of firms, institutions, suppliers, and service providers have different 
benefits than firms located elsewhere.  For example, clusters tend to have social networks due to 
both intentional and unintentional frequent interaction among employees working for different 
in-cluster firms. 
Information flows from its source through social networks in a cluster and therefore 
spillovers are localized.  This enables in-cluster firms to benefit from spillover effects.  Thus, if 
there are spillovers then firms might not form inter-firm alliances because the need to form 
alliances is already satisfied by the spillover effects.  This leads to in-cluster firms forming fewer 
alliances thereby being less central in their alliance networks.  Owen-Smith and Powell (2004) 
show that membership in a cluster provides access to information and other resources through 
informal channels in the region.  This suggests that in-cluster firms need not form alliances with 
other in-cluster firms because centrality in their local network will not bring any unique benefits 
to in-cluster firms.  In summary, spillover effects and social networks in a cluster substitute for 
formal alliances.   
The contradictory effects of complementary and substitution mechanisms thus prompt 
two competing predictions with respect to the relationship between cluster membership and 
centrality.  From the complementary view, cluster membership promotes or adds to the alliance 
network structure and hence, increases firms’ centrality.  Conversely, cluster membership 
substitutes for the alliance network structure leading to less centrality in the alliance network 
structure.    
Hypothesis 1a:  In-cluster firms are more central in their alliance network than firms 
located elsewhere.   
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Hypothesis 1b:  In-cluster firms are less central in their alliance network than firms 
located elsewhere. 
2.2.1.2 Cluster membership and structural holes 
Firms span structural holes in their networks when they connect firms that are not otherwise 
connected to each other.  The concept of structural holes is important because it illustrates that 
firms that have many alliances actually have access to diverse information if their alliance 
partners are not connected to each other (Burt, 1992; Koka and Prescott, 2002).  Consider a 
pharmaceutical company having alliances with two biotech companies which do not have an 
alliance with each other.  The pharmaceutical company may benefit by controlling information 
coming from both biotech companies.  In other words, the pharmaceutical company spans a 
structural hole between these two biotech firms.  Then, it is more likely that the pharmaceutical 
firm is aware of biopharmaceutical research conducted in two biotech companies.  In case of a 
novel research at the biotech company, the pharmaceutical company might be the one that 
benefits by forming a new alliance with the biotech firm, which might lead to development and 
marketing of a new pharmaceutical product.  However, if two biotech companies have an 
alliance with each other then it is also likely that they might share the novel research and proceed 
with a new drug development without the pharmaceutical company.  This means that the 
pharmaceutical company loses control over novel research (or is constrained) in its network 
because its alliance partners are also connected to each other.   
Similar to the cluster membership and centrality arguments, I use the complementary and 
substitution perspectives as underlying rationales for explaining cluster membership and 
structural holes relationship.  The reasoning is straight forward:  Based on the complementary 
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view firms located within cluster areas span more structural holes, while according to 
substitution perspective in-cluster firms span less structural holes in their alliance networks. 
According to the complementary view I argue that brokerage or tertius gaudens and 
information exchange due to cultural differences are two main mechanisms that explain the 
hypothesized relationship.  The idea of tertius gaudens or that “it is the third who benefits” is 
based on benefiting from a conflict between two parties (Simmel, 1950; Burt, 1992).  Based on 
the brokerage mechanism one argues that in-cluster firms act as a broker between two out-cluster 
firms who enter into an alliance with the same in-cluster firm (Burt, 1992).  As I discussed 
earlier, the need to access cluster resources motivates out-cluster firms in establishing 
partnerships with in-cluster firms due to scientific, technical, and engineering knowledge that 
clusters provide (Tallman et al. 2004).  Then, it is more likely that the same in-cluster firm 
establishes alliances with more out-cluster firms.  This implies that in-cluster firms may span 
more structural holes due to their location than out-cluster firms.  Put differently, in cluster firms 
act as brokers between two out-cluster firms thereby acquiring information benefits that come 
with brokerage.  Similarly, based on tertius gaudens arguments an in-cluster firm might also gain 
by acting as a tertius (Simmel, 1950).  For example, an in-cluster firm might be the licensor (or 
seller) of a novel pharmaceutical product to out-cluster firms.   
Information exchange is another mechanism that explains structural holes and innovation 
relationship.  Cultural differences across regions promote information exchange among firms.  
For example, Saxenian (1994) states that clusters have their own cultures.  Inkpen and Tsang 
(2005) further elaborate that cultural differences among partners motivate information exchange.  
Similarly, cluster specific knowledge includes component knowledge that is related to parts 
rather than the whole and it is available to all cluster members (Tallman et al. 2004).  Based on 
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the complementary mechanism, this also motivates out-cluster firms to form alliances with in-
cluster firms.  Thus,  derived from the above evidence, I posit that in-cluster firms span more 
structural holes because they provide access to cluster resources as brokers of alliance 
relationship, they act as a tertius among out-cluster firms, and exchange cluster specific 
information with out-of-cluster firms .   
 According to the alternate substitution view, however, firms’ in-cluster location 
might affect the degree of connectivity of in-cluster firms’ alliance partners.  The network 
closure rationale by Coleman (1988), serves as my underlying mechanism in the following 
hypothesized relationship.  Since social ties among in-cluster firms facilitate alliance formation 
with one another, then it is more likely that in-cluster firms’ partners located within the same 
cluster have alliances with each other as well.  Similarly, individuals working in close proximity 
develop a shared identity and become closer.  The social interaction among employees motivates 
alliance formation among their employers.  This means that in-cluster firms’ networks are more 
constrained, in other words, in-cluster firms have fewer structural holes in their ego networks.  
Gulati (1998) states that many alliance opportunities are presented to firms through their existing 
partners.  Therefore, if a firm has in-cluster partners it is more likely that this firm enters into 
alliances with other in-cluster firms more frequently due to reduced transaction and 
communication costs associated with proximity.  The same logic applies to alliances between in-
cluster firms’ partners as well.  According to the above view, interconnectivity among focal 
firms’ alliance partners might lead to a cohesive network (Coleman, 1988) that lacks structural 
holes.  This implies that an in-cluster firm’s alliance partners that are located in the same cluster 
are more likely to establish alliances with each other because of proximity.  Thus, an in-cluster 
firm is more constrained in its alliance network because its alliance partners are connected to one 
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another.  Put differently, according to the substitution and thereby network closure reasoning the 
part of a firm’s network structure with other in-cluster firms will be more constrained compared 
to an out-cluster firm’s overall network. 
 Based on the competing arguments stated above I suggest following hypotheses 
for the relationship between cluster membership and structural holes.  
Hypothesis 2a: In-cluster firms span more structural holes in their alliance network than 
firms located elsewhere.  
Hypothesis 2b: In-cluster firms span fewer structural holes in their alliance networks than firms 
located elsewhere. 
2.2.2 The endogenous alliance network structure with respect to cluster membership and 
innovation relationship:  Absorptive capacity as a moderator 
So far, I have argued that firms’ alliance network structure is endogenous with respect to cluster 
membership.  The endogeneity of alliance network structure is developed by means of two 
mechanisms.  First, according to complementary mechanism, cluster membership augments 
firms’ alliance network structure by providing necessary conditions such as reduced transaction 
costs associated with forming alliances.  Second, according to substitution mechanism, cluster 
membership replaces or holds back firms’ alliance network structure by providing access to free 
knowledge spillovers within geographical clusters.   
Thus, having theoretically established the endogenous nature of two network structure 
attributes- centrality and structural holes, in this part I develop theoretical arguments for the 
network structure and innovation relationship given the endogenous nature of network structure 
with respect to cluster membership.  This is important because prior work has established the 
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relationship between alliance network structure and innovation based on the strict exogeneity of 
alliance network structure.  However, the relationship between network structure and innovation 
can be subject to various firm specific factors such as cluster membership (i.e. geographic 
location within a cluster).  Therefore, in building the theoretical relationship for alliance network 
structure and innovation I also include the influence of cluster membership.   
Research examining the effects of network structure on innovation has supported a 
contingency view without considering the endogenous nature of network structure in theoretical 
and empirical models.  For instance, Owen-Smith and Powell (2004) argued and found that 
centrality in a geographically bounded network has no effect on innovation while centrality in a 
geographically dispersed network has a positive effect on innovation.  In other studies in which 
the geographic boundary of the network has not been contemplated as a contingency, the 
relationship between firms’ centrality and innovation has been positive (Ahuja, 2000; Shan et al. 
1994).  For example, Ahuja (2000) found that centrality, defined as a number of direct ties a firm 
has, positively affects innovation in global chemical companies.  Similarly, Shan et al (1994) 
found that the number of alliances of biotechnology start-ups positively influences their 
innovation.   
The link between structural holes and innovation has also been studied as a contingency 
or a direct relationship.  From the contingency view, McEvily and Yao (2004) found that firms’ 
structural holes positively moderate the relationship between absorptive capacity and innovation.  
Studying the effect of structural holes and innovation relationship without contingency factors, 
Ahuja (2000) found that increasing structural holes has a negative effect on firms’ innovation in 
the international chemicals industry.  Nonetheless, prior work has assumed that firms have the 
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capabilities necessary to exploit volume of information accessed due to centrality or diversity of 
information accessed due to spanning structural holes.   
In addition to the above contingency view in the literature, I suggest that firms’ 
absorptive capacity is another contingency factor that influences the relationship among 
centrality, structural holes and innovation.  While firms’ centrality and structural holes 
influenced by firms cluster membership provide access to information volume and diverse 
information respectively, absorptive capacity determines how efficient and effective this 
information will be utilized towards innovation.  Recent research suggests that firms innovate to 
the extent that they have absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).   
Absorptive capacity is the ability to acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit external 
information for firm advantage (Lane, Koka, and Pathak, 2006; Zahra & George, 2002; Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990).  Firms may have access to large amounts of diverse information due to their 
centrality and structural holes they span in their network structure, which is influenced by their 
cluster membership.  However, their innovation will not be positively affected unless they 
exploit this information.  I suggest that the effect of firms’ centrality and structural holes 
influenced by cluster membership on their innovation depends upon their absorptive capacity.  
Thus, centrality and structural holes might be necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
innovation given the effect of cluster membership on firms’ centrality and structural holes. 
2.2.2.1 Centrality and absorptive capacity 
I draw on the social capital argument to explain the relationship between firms’ centrality and 
innovation.  I build on the arguments that alliance network structure provides information 
resources that are defined as social capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).  Performance 
implication of social capital has been previously explored in the literature.  For example, Koka 
 26
and Prescott (2002) theoretically argued and empirically demonstrated that information resources 
firms acquire due to their alliances are social capital and this is contingently related to firm 
performance in the steel industry.  Therefore, I suggest that central firms have more social capital 
in terms of information volume.  Yet, social capital by itself does not suffice to explain centrality 
and innovation relationship in a comprehensive way.  Thus, I complement this view with a 
contingency argument by looking at the moderating effect of absorptive capacity for the 
relationship between centrality and innovation, given the endogenous nature of firms’ centrality. 
Based on this reasoning I suggest that although firms’ centrality in their alliances 
provides information volume the use of this information is likely to be contingent on firms’ 
absorptive capacity.  That is, firms that have the ability to acquire, assimilate, transform and 
commercialize information are likely to have greater innovation benefits from their central 
position in their alliance networks.  The process through which absorptive capacity is developed 
provides support for this line of reasoning.  For example, centrality provides access to and in turn 
acquisition of information but this does not necessarily mean that information will be productive 
in terms of innovation.  Firms need to have capabilities to comprehend, interpret (Lane & 
Lubatkin, 1998); to internalize and convert information into usable form (Kim, 1998) and finally 
to commercialize it (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  In other words, if firms have access to 
information but do not have the sufficient level of capabilities to convert this information into a 
usable form then it is likely that they will not receive positive benefits.  Tsai’s (2001) study 
supports this reasoning; he found that the interaction between centrality and absorptive capacity 
has a positive significant effect on firms’ innovation in the context of intra-firm networks.  
Extending his arguments to alliance networks I suggest that absorptive capacity will positively 
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influence the relationship between firms’ centrality in their alliance networks and their 
innovation.    
Hypothesis 3:  Given the endogeneity of firms’ centrality in their alliance network 
structure with respect to their cluster membership, firms’ absorptive capacity positively 
moderates the relationship between firms’ centrality in their alliance networks and innovation. 
2.2.2.2 Structural holes and absorptive capacity 
Firms span structural holes when their partners are not connected to each other (Burt, 1992).  
From a structural holes perspective, firms have access to diverse information when they span 
structural holes in their network.  As stated previously, prior literature suggests two competing 
views for the relationship between structural holes and innovation (Ahuja, 2000) without 
considering the endogenous nature of structural holes.  According to resource sharing view, 
disconnections among firms’ alliance network hinders information sharing and therefore, 
structural holes are negatively related to innovation.  According to information diversity view, 
however, if firms’ network includes too many disconnections then firms have access to diverse 
information which increases firm innovation.  Reconciling these two competing views, I suggest 
a contingency argument to include firm’s absorptive capacity as a moderator for the relationship 
between structural holes and innovation based on two mechanisms.   
First, according to structural holes argument, disconnections in firms’ alliance networks 
provide diverse information (Burt, 1992; Koka and Prescott, 2002).   However, efficient and 
effective use of this diverse information depends on the level of absorptive capacity a firm has.  
Although Ahuja (2000) found that the number of structural holes spanned by a firm is negatively 
related with its innovation in international chemicals industry, I suggest a positive moderating 
effect of absorptive capacity in the structural holes and innovation relationship.  Even if the 
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range of diverse information is large due to the presence of structural holes in their alliance 
network, firms are more likely to build on their existing capabilities because absorptive capacity 
is path dependent (Zahra & George, 2002).  Put differently, subsequent information acquisition 
depends on prior information acquired.  This suggests that it is more likely that firms build on 
similar information rather than diverse information.   
Second, drawing from the bounded rationality reasoning (Simon, 1997), similar to 
individuals, firms do not have infinite capabilities to acquire, assimilate and exploit information.  
Due to both financial and physical limitations firms can only pursue certain line of research 
(Ahuja, 2000).  This is apparent in the biopharmaceutical sector where many small biotech 
companies work on only one therapeutic area.  Drug development is a long process and usually it 
takes on average 15 years to develop and market a final drug.  Naturally, firms are more likely to 
build on their existing research rather than starting over with a diverse information base.  
Therefore, even if firms have access to diverse information due to structural holes in their 
network, they are more likely to build on their existing information base.  Similarly, McEvily 
and Yao (2005) suggest that even if firms have diverse information, they are only able to make 
connections with their existing information base due to their absorptive capacity.  Therefore, 
based on structural holes and bounded rationality reasoning I suggest that firms’ absorptive 
capacity positively affects the relationship between structural holes firms span and their 
innovation given the endogenous nature of structural holes.    
Hypothesis 4:  Given the endogeneity of firms’ structural holes in their alliance network 
structure with respect to their cluster membership, firms’ absorptive capacity positively 
moderates the relationship between firms’ structural holes in their alliance networks and 
innovation. 
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3.0  METHODS 
3.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT AND DATA COLLECTION 
The context for this research is the US biopharmaceutical sector.  Both clustering and alliance 
networks have been shown to influence firms’ innovation in this sector (Arora and Gambardella, 
1990; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Powell, et al., 1999; McKelvey et al., 2003; Owen-Smith & 
Powell, 2004).  The complexity of biopharmaceutical products contributes to rising financial 
costs and an increase in time spent on development4.  These two factors have led to increased 
dependency on R&D alliances.  The number of alliances, particularly R&D alliances, has grown 
tremendously over the last five years in the biopharmaceutical sector.  According to the Deloitte 
Research on alliance formation the total value of new alliances including only pharmaceutical 
and biotech companies has grown from $6 billion in 1999 to $11 billion in 2004.  In addition, 
this sector is among the fastest growing industries in the US, the inflation adjusted 
biopharmaceutical industry output is expected to increase from $69.2 billion in 2004 to $128.3 
billion in 2014 (Milken Institute Fact Sheet, 2004).  As people age and economies grow, 
consumers will demand more and better medical care.  These developments increase the 
                                                 
4 For example, the development cost for a new drug is over $800 million, and it takes on average 15 years to develop 
a drug.   
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importance of biopharmaceutical sector in the future.  Therefore, understanding this sector is 
indispensable for scientific research.   
Data used to test the hypotheses in this study were obtained from several sources.  First, 
using the Mergent Online, Compustat, and Thomson databases I identified 215 public companies 
that designate their primary business as pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834).  However, due 
to missing data on several variables for multiple years I lose 68 firms.  My final sample consisted 
of 147 biopharmaceutical firms from 1998 to 2004.  In summary, I have 847 observations for 
147 firms in my final longitudinal dataset. 
Second, I relied on Mergent online, Compustat, Edgar database, and company websites in 
order to gather geographic location data that includes both headquarters and R&D facilities 
location.  In order to identify firms’ geographic location I obtained company addresses from 
Mergent online.  Since clusters are identified based on metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and 
MSAs are defined to include counties, I also had to identify counties that firms in my sample are 
located.  County and MSA information were obtained from the US Census bureau.  Financial 
information including, assets, sales, R&D expenditures, and number of employees data were also 
obtained from the same sources and supplemented from Worldscope.  
Third, data on R&D alliances were obtained from Recombinant Capital (Recap), a private 
database that tracks and analyzes alliances including biopharmaceutical firms.  The Recap 
database has been extensively used in prior studies (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; McEvily & Yao, 
2005).  Validity of alliance data has also been checked against Thomson Financial Security Data 
Company’s alliance database (SDC).  The Recap database has the most comprehensive alliance 
data as it includes all the alliances of biopharmaceutical firms with other firms as well as other 
organizations such as government institutions, and universities.  In this study, I focus on R&D 
 31
alliances which include all research and development activities pertaining to discovery and 
development of a pharmaceutical end product.  I collected cumulative alliance data for the period 
between 1995 and 2004.  Given the judgment in my cutoff point (1995) in the data collection, 
left censoring might be an issue.  However, this may not affect the validity of results of this study 
for several reasons.   
First, the biopharmaceutical industry is relatively new industry when excluding the big 
pharmaceutical firms.  For example, the average age of companies in my sample is nineteen 
years.  Second, the alliance activity in this sector picked up in 1990s.  The number of new 
alliances formed increased from 341 in 1990 to more than 2,000 new alliances in 2000 (Recap 
Inc).  Third, I restricted the analysis for the period between 1998 and 2004; this confirms that 
alliances formed between 1995 and 1997 were completely represented in the cumulative alliance 
network of 1998.  Finally, my alliance database includes 5,367 alliances (including 3,086 
organizations) since 1995.  Since I focus only on R&D alliance my dataset represents 40% of the 
entire alliance data Recap Inc has in the biopharmaceutical sector since 1973.  Thus, I believe 
that that my alliance dataset is representative of alliance activity in the biopharmaceutical sector 
and left censoring of data is not an issue in my analysis.   
Finally, I gathered patent data to measure innovation from the US Patents- Granted 
Collection on Delphion.  Delphion’s database includes information on all patents granted by the 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) since 1971. Since my study includes US companies I 
limited my search to the patents granted to US companies by the US patent Office.  Delphion has 
also been used in prior studies (Chacar and Lieberman, 2003; Furman et al., 2005). 
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3.2 CLUSTER IDENTIFICATION 
I identify the US clusters based on the Milken Institute’s America’s Biotech and Life sciences 
Clusters, 2004 Study (see Figure 2).  The Milken Institute (2004) has identified 12 metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSA) in the US as biopharmaceutical clusters.  These clusters have shown the 
greatest concentration and specialization of biopharmaceutical firms (for a more detailed 
description, see Milken Institute, 2004, America’s biotech and life sciences clusters).  A few 
studies identified clusters based on calculating the relative distance among individual firms 
across a geographic area (Aharonson, Baum, and Feldman, 2004), or based on an economic area 
identified by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (Porter, 2003).  Others have used MSA to 
identify geographic units or clusters (Jaffe et al. 1993; Feldman, 1994).   
In order to validate my use of Milken study in cluster identification in the 
biopharmaceutical industry I compared clusters I employed in this study to the 
biopharmaceutical clusters identified by the Cluster Mapping Project (2002) at the Institute for 
Strategy and Competitiveness, Harvard Business School.  The results of the comparison show 
that clusters that are identified by the Milken Study were also identified as biopharmaceutical 
clusters by the Cluster Mapping Project.  However, the Milken study is a more comprehensive 
study on biopharmaceutical clusters in the US than the Cluster Mapping Project because 
Milken’s cluster identification process takes into consideration innovation, industry 
concentration, the availability of financial resources, local talent pool, and occupational strengths 
associated with clusters.  The Cluster Mapping Project approach is based on the employment 
levels of biopharmaceutical industry firms and its suppliers and buyers in supporting industries.  
Thus, I believe that Milken Study’s cluster identification is the most appropriate way to 
operationalize my independent variable, cluster membership. 
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3.3 MEASURES 
3.3.1 Independent variable 
3.3.1.1 Cluster membership 
Previous studies identified cluster membership based on firms’ headquarters location in a cluster 
area (Bell, 2005; DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999; Aharonson et. al., 2004; Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2004).  In a study in which the determinants of relocating HQ to overseas is examined, 
Birkinshaw et al (2006) state that there is no definitive way to measure corporate HQ location.  
They consider three relevant indicators of HQ location: the legal domicile, the location of top 
management team and the location of the various HQ functions.  Following their study, first, I 
identify the location of corporate HQ in a cluster area by firms’ registered address5.  Second, 
based on the location of HQ functions approach I also look at the location of R&D functions 
because biopharmaceutical sector is highly research intensive, and research is conducted in 
formal R&D-Laboratories.  In general, firms have R&D-Labs in their corporate headquarters 
locations (more than two thirds of firms in my sample have R&D-Labs in headquarters 
locations).  Further, most of the biopharmaceutical companies that have corporate headquarters 
location outside of clusters, particularly big firms, have R&D-Laboratories located within cluster 
areas.  For example, Abbott Laboratories is identified as out-cluster firm based on its 
headquarters location but Abbott also has R&D-Labs in various clusters.  By the same token, 
Chacar and Lieberman (2003) found that geographic organization of firms’ R&D-Laboratories 
                                                 
5 One drawback of choosing corporate HQ address is that it may not show the physical location where the HQ 
functions are performed (Birkinshaw et. al. 2006).  For example, some companies may form a shell holding 
company in an offshore location to benefit from tax advantages.  Fortunately, with my sample this is not an issue 
because I focused on US biopharmaceutical companies and an examination of my dataset indicates that none of my 
sample firms have locations outside of US. 
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have significant effect on research productivity of pharmaceutical firms.  This indicates that by 
having R&D-Laboratories in cluster areas firms might benefit from clusters to some extent if not 
in full.   
In summary, I measure cluster membership in two different ways.  First, I identify in-
cluster firms based on their corporate headquarters location in any of 12 clusters identified 
above.  I use a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm is headquartered within a 
cluster and 0 otherwise.  Second, I also identify cluster membership based on R&D facilities’ 
location data.  I identify firms having at least one R&D-Laboratory in a cluster area as in-cluster 
firms.  Again, I use a dummy variable in order to identify in-cluster and out-cluster firms based 
on their R&D-Laboratory location. I assign the value of 1 if a firm has at least one R&D-Lab 
within a cluster, 0 otherwise.   
3.3.2 Network structure variables   
Although my study period includes 1998 through 2004, I established complete alliance network 
structure for each year for the period between 1995 and 2004.  This confirms my best effort that 
alliances established prior to 1998 are represented in my alliance network structure.  I calculate 
network measures based on cumulative alliance network matrices for R&D alliances for the 
period of 1998 and 2004.  I used UCINET-6 network analysis software in order to calculate the 
network measures (Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. 2002).  My network structure 
variables are calculated based on the complete network that includes the entire 
biopharmaceutical firms as well as other organizations with which they have alliances.   
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3.3.2.1 Centrality 
In hypotheses 1a and 1b I argue that firms’ in-cluster location is positively associated with its 
number of alliances.  This actually indicates how active a firm is in its alliance network.  Thus, to 
measure firms’ centrality in their alliance network I use Freeman’s degree centrality measure.  A 
firm’s degree centrality is the sum of its alliances with its partners.  The degree centrality 
measure is a well accepted measure and it is widely used in studies where the focus is on firms’ 
alliance activity (Madhavan, 1996; Ahuja, 2000).  Although there are different ways to measure 
centrality in a network I specifically focus on the opportunities or alternatives that cluster 
membership brings for firms in terms of alliances.  Therefore, degree centrality is an appropriate 
measure for my study.  Other approaches in measuring centrality include closeness centrality and 
betweennes centrality.   Closeness centrality emphasizes the distance of ego to all others in the 
network while betweennes centrality focuses on centrality based on being on the path of two 
actors (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005).   
3.3.2.2 Structural Holes 
Structural holes indicate what proportion of ego’s ties are non-redundant (Burt, 1992).  
Following the prior literature, I measure the structural holes a firm spans in its alliance network 
by using the ratio of non-redundant contacts to total contacts (Burt, 1992; Ahuja, 2000, McEvily 
and Yao, 2005).  This measure is calculated as an index: 
n n 
[∑ [1-∑piqmjq]] / Ci 
j =1     q =1 
Where focal firm i has partners of j and q.  Piq is the ratio of  firm i’s alliances with firm q 
to its total number of alliances; mjq is the marginal strength of the alliance between alliance 
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partner j and alliance partner q; and Ci is the total number of alliances for firm i.   A higher index 
value for a firm indicates that this firm spans more structural holes, in other words its alliance 
partners do not have alliances with each other.  If a focal firm’s alliance partners do not have 
alliances with each other then the index value for that firm is 1.  I use efficiency measure in 
UCINET-6 in order to calculate the structural holes.  In UCINET I use the whole network 
method when calculating the efficiency measure.  The whole network model includes the entire 
network when calculating the efficiency measure.  In other words, structural holes among focal 
firm’s indirect ties are also included in the measure. 
3.3.3 Moderator variable 
3.3.3.1 Absorptive Capacity 
I measure firm’s absorptive capacity by its R&D intensity.  Since some of the firms in my 
sample have zero sales for some years I take R&D intensity as a ratio of R&D expenditures over 
total assets.  R&D intensity as a measure of absorptive capacity is appropriate measure for my 
context, because using absolute number of R&D expenditure might bias my results as my sample 
consists of large and small biopharmaceutical firms.  In the empirical literature absorptive 
capacity has been measured in several ways.  Some studies use patent citations (Rothaermal and 
Thursby, 2005), patent stock (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005), R&D intensity (Arora and 
Gambardella, 1994), R&D expenditures (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Negassi, 2004), 
compensation policies, and dominant logic (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998).  Evidence on 
appropriateness of measures for absorptive capacity has been inconsistent largely due to the 
context of studies and the definition of absorptive capacity construct (Lane, Koka, and Pathak. 
2006).  Although limitations of R&D as a measure of absorptive capacity have been raised it is 
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still a common practice to measure firms’ absorptive capacity with R&D expenditure or R&D 
intensity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 
2005).  
3.3.4 Interaction Variables 
I create two multiplicative interaction variables to measure the moderating effect of absorptive 
capacity for the centrality and innovation, and structural holes and innovation relationship.  To 
represent the interaction between centrality and absorptive capacity I first centered the centrality 
and absorptive capacity variables and then multiplied the centered values.  Centering the 
interaction variables before their multiplication is necessary in order to reduce the correlation 
between the interaction and main variables.  The same procedure also applied for structural holes 
and absorptive capacity interaction.   
3.3.5 Dependent Variable 
3.3.5.1 Innovation 
I adopt the definition of innovation as incorporating new technology into the means of 
production or creation of new product that range from breakthrough products to incremental 
improvements in products (Feldman, 2000).  I measure innovation performance of firms using a 
firm’s annual count of patents granted.  There are a number of measures of a firm’s innovation 
performance adopted in the empirical literature (see Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003, for a recent 
review). Some studies use surveys of new product announcements (Acs and Audretsch, 1988) 
while others use R&D expenditures as a measure of a firm’s innovation competencies 
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(Henderson and Cockburn, 1994).   Patents (Griliches, 1990), and patent citations (Trajtenberg, 
1990; Harhoff et al., 1999) are also among the accepted measures of innovative performance.  
However, the use of patent data for measuring innovation performance has its drawbacks 
(Griliches, 1990).  Despite their drawbacks, patents are widely accepted as a measure for 
innovation performance.  In the biopharmaceutical sector, R&D takes a long time and the 
outcome of such research is not reflected immediately in firms’ sales figures.  Therefore, the use 
of patent data as a measure of innovation of biopharmaceutical firms is an appropriate measure 
of innovation performance in the context of this research. 
3.3.6 Control Variables   
3.3.6.1 Firm size 
I measure firm size by number of employees since previous studies have indicated that firm size 
can influence innovation performance in the biopharmaceutical industry (Shan et all., 1994).  
Biopharmaceutical firms with large number of employees are perceived to have more scientists 
devoted to R&D and therefore a greater amount of patent output.  I use log of number of 
employees. 
3.3.6.2 Firm age 
Since firm age affects the rate at which firms patent (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000), I control for the 
number of years passed since founding of firm i to the year of the observation of the dependent 
variable. 
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3.3.6.3 Indirect ties 
A focal firm’s partners can bring information from their alliances with other partners to the focal 
firm.  Firms’ alliance networks may act as an information gathering or as an information 
processing device (Ahuja, 2000; Freeman, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1984).  Therefore, both the 
amount and diversity of information that is acquired by a focal firm is affected by its indirect ties 
within its alliance network.  For example, let’s take a pharmaceutical company that has an 
alliance with a biotech company.  Now let’s assume that the biotech company has an alliance 
with a university that is involved in basic research in the biotech field.  The pharmaceutical 
company through its alliance with the biotech company might be aware of the basic research 
conducted in the university even though the pharmaceutical company does not have a direct 
alliance with the university.  Similarly, Ahuja (2000) showed that the indirect ties of a firm in the 
chemical industry have a positive effect on firms’ number of patents.  I use reach centrality 
function that is built in UCINET 6 in order to control for the effect of indirect ties on innovation.  
This measure provides the proportion of firms that a focal firm can reach in j or fewer steps in its 
alliance network (Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. 2002, Ucinet 6).   
3.3.6.4 Time (year effects) 
Biopharmaceutical industry is research intensive industry.  Scientific breakthroughs during 
certain years might affect firms’ innovation in the following years.  For example, deriving of the 
first human embryonic stem cell line at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1998 was 
followed by various research activities in the stem cell research.  Thus, in order to capture 
temporal trends that are related to current technological and environmental conditions and that 
might affect firms’ innovation I control for time effects.  This is controlled by including a 
dummy variable for all but one year (Wooldridge, 2003, pg. 427).  I take 1998 as a base year and 
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use a dummy variable for each of the following year.  I also estimate my models without the time 
effects.  The results do not change.  Table 2 provides a summary of my variables and relevant 
interaction terms.  
3.4 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
A summary of the geographic locations of my sample based on metropolitan statistical areas can 
be found in Table 3.  Further, an examination of average statistics in Table 4 yields the following 
observations about my sample in particular and clustering phenomenon in general in the 
biopharmaceutical sector.  However, I should note that one should not draw conclusions based 
on the sample characteristics in Table 4.  This table also illustrates how looking at and driving 
conclusions about the relationships among variables based on raw data on sample characteristics 
might be misleading in the empirical research.  Table 4 is based on the static analysis of data 
with the normality assumption.  However, data for several of the variables in this study are not 
normal and relationships among variables change once I specify regression models based on the 
correct distribution of data.  Results of our regression analysis includes the effect of several 
independent and control variables on the dependent variable in the same model while accounting 
for endogeneity of variables, unobserved effects over time and associated time effects.  
 Therefore, keeping in mind the important points stated above, based on the headquarters 
location, I observe that 49% of firms have headquarters outside of cluster areas.  These out-
cluster firms also have higher number of patents than firms that have their headquarters location 
inside clusters (on average 94 patents for out-cluster firms versus 33 firms for in-cluster firms, 
pvalue=00, significant).  On the other hand, when I look at the R&D-Lab location data, which is 
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based on firms’ having at least one R&D-Lab inside the cluster average statistics are closer.  If I 
identify in-cluster firms as those firms having at least one R&D-Lab inside cluster, then there is 
not a big difference between in-cluster and out-cluster firms (in terms of average sales: 
1,680MM for in-cluster versus 1,433MM for out-cluster firms, pvalue=0.56).  Further, on 
average out-cluster firms have 67 patents while in-cluster firms have 63 patents (pvalue= 0.77).  
Further analysis related to sample characteristics is provided in the Appendix, Table 1A and 
Figures 1A-3A.  
My dataset consists of panel data for the period between 1998 and 2004 for firms in my sample.  
Since the number of observations for each firm is not the same my dataset is therefore 
unbalanced.  Panel data design is appropriate for this study as I have a diverse sample including 
both established pharmaceutical and biotech companies.  Unobservable firm characteristics such 
as competitive strategy, organizational culture, and ethical stance of biopharmaceutical firms 
towards controversial treatments may affect firms’ innovation as well.  Therefore, I have to 
account for these unobservable factors in my model in order to have consistent coefficient 
estimates for independent variables.  Panel dataset is advantageous over cross-sectional datasets 
because it allows dealing with aforementioned unobserved effects across individual firms and 
allows unobserved effects to be correlated with the explanatory variables (Greene, 2003, pp. 284; 
Wooldridge, pp.13, pp. 471). 
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4.0  ANALYSIS 
I tested my hypotheses using negative binomial regression, generalized least squares regression, 
and an exponential regression with Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM) estimation.  The 
exponential regression with GMM estimation includes an exogenous variable (Cluster 
membership), endogenous explanatory variables (Centrality and Structural holes), instrumental 
variables (Headquarters location, HQ; at least one R&D-Lab within a cluster, and lagged patent-
by one year- variable) and a count dependent variable (number of patents).  I test hypothesized 
relationships in my model in two stages.   
In the first stage, I test the theoretical relationship between cluster membership, centrality 
and structural holes variables (Hypotheses 1 and 2) by a random effects model.  Since my 
independent variable HQ location (or R&D-Lab location) is time invariant, fixed effects model is 
not appropriate.  In other words, no firm relocated to another geographical area during my study 
period.  As my dependent variable, Centrality in the first hypothesis (cluster membership-
centrality relationship) is constrained to be count, nonnegative integer values I test the 
hypothesized relationship by a nonlinear regression model to avoid heteroskedastic, non-normal 
residuals (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984).  Specifically, I use a negative binomial regression.  
Although the Poisson regression is a first model choice considered for count data, the assumption 
is too restrictive (Wooldridge, 2003).  In particular, it is assumed that variance is equal to mean 
(that is equi-dispersion of data).  I, however, have over dispersed Centrality data in which 
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variance exceeds mean (variance= 181.30 > mean= 7.83).  In cases of over dispersed data, 
negative binomial regression is more appropriate (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  I estimate the 
model by using the random effects xtenbreg function in STATA-9.   
I test hypothesis 2 (cluster membership-structural holes relationship) by using random 
effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is not 
appropriate for my study as I have unbalanced panel data.  OLS regression is based on the 
assumptions of homoscedasticity (error terms have constant variance) and no autocorrelation of 
error terms.  However, panel datasets exhibit heteroscedasticity (error terms have different 
variances) and autocorrelation (Greene, 2003, pp. 192).  Taking this information into account I 
use GLS model which corrects for the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of error terms 
observed with unbalanced panel data (Greene, 2003, pp. 192).   Using GLS produces BLUE - 
best linear unbiased estimators (Wooldridge, 2003, pp. 404).  I test the hypothesis using the 
xtpcse function with np1 option in STATA-9.  This function produces panel corrected standard 
error estimates for panel data models where the parameters are estimated by Prais-Winsten 
estimation.  Prais- Winsten estimation specifies that panel specific autocorrelations are weighted 
by number of observations in each panel (STATA-9).   
In the second stage, to test the moderating effect of absorptive capacity for the centrality- 
innovation and structural holes innovation hypotheses (hypotheses 3 and 4) I employ an 
exponential regression model with GMM estimator due to the endogenous nature of my 
independent variables.  Particularly, I use a fixed effects model with General Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation6.  I use the fixed effects model in an exponential form because my 
                                                 
6 GMM only involves structural equation estimation with the help of instruments, instruments are 
orthogonal to structural errors and by benefiting from this property no reduced form equation is estimated in the 
GMM estimation.  In contrast, in 2SLS with MLE a reduced form equation is estimated first. 
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dependent variable (patent) is a count variable.  The model takes the following general form 
(Cincera, 1997):  
Pit = exp (Xitβ + εi) + uit  
Where Pit represents dependent variable, number o patents granted; Xit indicates vector of 
independent and control variables, and εi represents the unobserved effects not captured by the 
variables in the model.   
Count data such as patent data have several significant features that require specific 
econometric methods (Crepon and Duguet, 1997).  While negative binomial and Poisson models 
are commonly used in the patenting literature (Lenox and King, 2003; Iwasa and Odagiri, 2004; 
Lim, 2004) they do not account for endogeneity of regressors.  Therefore, they are not 
appropriate for my model since I have endogenous variables.  In the first stage of my model, my 
analysis shows that both headquarters location cluster and at least one R&D-Lab inside cluster 
has significant positive effect on both the centrality and structural holes (HQ and R&D-Lab 
location, p<0.05).  These significant results show the positive effect of cluster membership on 
firms’ network structure thereby, establishing the endogenous nature of the centrality and 
structural holes variables in the model.  I also tested for endogeneity by using the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test in STATA.  Results of this test also confirm the endogeneity of centrality and 
structural holes variables.  Please see Appendix for results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
Having established the endogeneity of independent variables (centrality and structural 
hoes), I have to account for the endogeneity of centrality and structural holes variables in the 
second stage of my model.  I use headquarters location (HQ), at least one R&D-Lab location 
inside a cluster (R&D-Lab), and lagged patent variable (lagged patent data by one year) as 
instruments in the exponential regression model.  Taking all this information into account I use 
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fixed effects model with General Methods of Moments (GMM) estimation to test hypotheses 3 
and 4.  Recent empirical research in economics and finance has largely used GMM estimation 
(Greene, 2003).  In models with endogenous explanatory variables, fixed effects exponential 
regression model with GMM estimation has several advantages over Poisson and negative 
binomial models with Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE).  First, GMM estimation does not 
assume equality of variance and mean of count data (in Poisson Model) or over-dispersion 
(variance is larger than mean) of data in negative binomial model.  In other words, in contrast to 
MLE, GMM estimation assumption is distribution free.  Second, GMM estimation accounts for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of error terms.  Finally, it relaxes the strict exogeneity 
assumption of explanatory variables7 (Cincera, 1997; Crepon and Duguet, 1997).  I use a Gauss 
program that accounts for both endogeneity and count dependent variable to test hypotheses 3 
and 4.  As I stated previously, although negative binomial model is not appropriate for my 
analysis because my explanatory variables (centrality and structural holes) are endogenous, I run 
my analysis using negative binomial model for comparison purposes.  I provide results of 
negative binomial model in Models 3-4 in Table 8, and Models 3-4 in Table 9.   
In the second stage of my analysis, the inclusion of time effects requires further 
elaboration.  The error term in the regression models including panel data may include time 
varying error due to the unobserved factors that change over time and affect the dependent 
variable (Wooldridge, 2003).  Generally, in instrumental variable estimation time dummy 
variables are included to account for omitted variables bias due to time effects.  This may occur 
because instruments used in the regression models may be correlated with time effects.  
However, in my models I use HQ and R&D-Lab as instruments.  As I stated previously these 
                                                 
7 In my model I have endogenous regressors:  centrality and structural holes. 
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instruments (or exogenous variables) are time invariant.  Thus, there is no need to separately 
account for time effects by using time dummies in the second stage of my analysis which 
includes GMM estimation. 
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5.0  RESULTS 
5.1 FINDINGS 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the 847 observations in the sample.  
The descriptive statistics indicate that the firms are characterized by significant diversity on key 
variables such as patent (number of patent ranges from 0 to 1,624), centrality (number of 
alliances ranges from 0 to 100), absorptive capacity (range from 0 to 697.9), and company age (1 
to 118 years old).  Thus, inclusion of 147 biopharmaceutical firms in the sample ensures that 
there is a considerable variance on almost all dimensions of the data. On average, firms have 8 
alliances and 65 patents.  The average age of firms in the sample is 19 years. 
The correlation matrix shows low to moderate correlations among variables. However, 
these should be interpreted with caution as I do not have a linear relationship among some 
variables.  Correlations are based on the assumption of linear relationship.  For example, 
between headquarters (HQ) location and centrality I have an exponential relationship due to the 
negative binomial distribution of data for the centrality variable.  Thus, it is not appropriate to 
interpret that there is a negative correlation between HQ location and centrality variables (corr = 
-0.048).   
Results of the first and second stage regression analysis are provided in Tables 6-7, and 
8-9 respectively.  Table 6 presents the results of negative binomial regression analysis for 
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hypothesis 1.  Model 1 includes effect of HQ location (cluster membership defined as having HQ 
inside cluster) on centrality.  Model 2 includes effect of R&D-Lab location (cluster membership 
defined as having at least one R&D-Lab inside cluster) on centrality.  In hypothesis 1, I propose 
competing predictions for the effect of firms’ in-cluster location on their central position in their 
alliance network structure.   The data indicate, in support of hypothesis 1a that firms’ in-cluster 
location when measured by HQ location is positively associated with being more central in their 
R&D alliance network structure compared to firms located elsewhere (p<0.05).  That is, in-
cluster location complements firms’ central position in their alliance networks structure.  
Therefore, the competing hypothesis 1b is rejected.  Results of hypothesis 1a are also significant 
when I estimate the model with R&D-Lab location variable as a proxy for cluster membership 
(p<0.05).  The significant findings for the impact of HQ location and R&D-Lab location on 
centrality indicate that firms that have headquarters location or R&D-Lab inside a cluster area 
will have positive network effects in terms of increased centrality compared to out-cluster firms.  
However, whether this network advantage translates into innovation will be explored in 
Hypothesis 3.  Both Models 1 and 2 include control variables of absorptive capacity, firm size, 
company age, indirect ties, and time effects.  Except the absorptive capacity variable all control 
variables are significant in both HQ location and R&D-Lab location models.   
In Table 7, I report the results of the first stage regression analysis using random effects 
GLS model for hypothesis 2.  Model 1 presents the effect of HQ variable (cluster membership 
measured by HQ location) on firms’ structural holes.  Model 2 includes the effect of R&D-Lab 
location variable (cluster membership measured by at least one R&D-Lab in cluster) on 
structural holes.  Absorptive capacity, firm size, company age, and time effects are control 
variables in the models.  Similar to hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2 also proposed competing 
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explanations for the in-cluster location and structural holes relationship.  The results support 
hypothesis 2a, that in-cluster firms span more structural holes in their R&D alliance networks 
than firms located elsewhere (p<0.001).  Similar to hypothesis 1a, in-cluster location 
complements firms’ structural holes in their alliance network structures.  The competing 
hypothesis 2b is rejected.  Results are also significant when I ran the analysis with R&D-Lab 
location variable as a proxy for in-cluster location (p<0.001).  The significant findings for 
Hypothesis 2 (cluster membership and structural holes relationship) indicate that having a 
headquarters (or at least one R&D-Lab) within a cluster leads to higher structural holes 
compared to firms that do not have headquarters (or at least one R&D-Lab) within cluster.  
Similar to arguments in hypothesis 1, in-cluster firms have structural holes advantage, which 
brings in information diversity.  I will explore whether firms can convert this benefit into 
innovation in Hypothesis 4.   
Results for the control variables in Hypothesis 2 are interesting.  In contrast to 
Hypothesis 1, absorptive capacity is significant in both HQ location and R&D-Lab location 
models.  This states that firms’ absorptive capacity influences their structural holes while 
absorptive capacity does not influence centrality.  I should note that I included absorptive 
capacity of firms as a control variable in models for hypotheses 1 and 2 in order to account for 
the effect of firm’s absorptive capacity on firms’ centrality and structural holes they span.  This 
is necessary because firms that have high absorptive capacity are in a better position to exploit 
their knowledge and thus become both alliance initiators and targets.  This positively influences 
firms’ centrality.  Further, firms’ absorptive capacity may also affect structural holes firms span 
because absorptive capacity is path dependent and firms build on existing knowledge.  
Therefore, it is more likely that firms do not collaborate with other technologically distant firms 
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(Ahuja, 2000) due to their limitations in acquiring, assimilating, and exploiting external 
knowledge.  The inclusion of absorptive capacity as a control variable in the first stage analysis 
does not change the results of the second stage analysis in any way because the estimation of 
second stage model (the moderating effect of absorptive capacity for the centrality, structural 
holes and innovation relationship) is estimated independent of the first stage estimation.  One 
point related to the control variable of indirect ties also requires additional explanation.  In 
testing the second hypothesis I do not control for the effect of indirect ties because the structural 
holes measure already includes the effect of indirect ties in the entire network.  UCINET 6 
provides two ways to calculate structural holes measure by using the efficiency measure: one that 
is based on the ego network calculation, another that is based on the whole network calculation.  
I chose to calculate the structural holes (efficiency measure) based on the whole network to 
account for the effect of indirect ties.   
Table 8 provides the results for the second stage exponential regression analysis that 
includes fixed effects model with GMM estimation for hypothesis 3.  I predict that firms’ 
absorptive capacity positively moderates the centrality and innovation relationship.  Coefficient 
of the interaction variable (0.001), centrality X absorptive capacity in Table 8 (Model 1) provides 
support for hypothesis 3, that the interaction between firms’ absorptive capacity and centrality is 
positive and significant.  This indicates that based on firms’ absorptive capacity central firms 
innovate more than other firms when endogeneity of centrality is controlled with HQ location.  
However, when I do not control for endogeneity the moderating effect is not significant (Model 
3).  This finding is important because it shows that the relationship between centrality and firm 
innovation is more complex than it is originally studied.  Although it is not one of my 
hypothesis, the positive and significant coefficient of centrality variable (0.3) supports the prior 
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literature that the higher the centrality of firm in its alliance network the higher the innovation 
(p<0.05) (Ahuja, 2000).  This further, provides a strong support for earlier literature, where 
centrality and innovation has been positively linked (Ahuja, 2000; Owen-Smith and Powel, 
2004).  I should note that there might still be differences in the magnitude of coefficients in 
models where endogeneity controlled and magnitude of coefficients in models where 
endogeneity is not controlled. I also estimate the models by controlling for endogeneity with 
R&D-Lab location variable.  The results are similar.  Control variables are not significant except 
absorptive capacity.  The negative and significant coefficient of the absorptive capacity variable 
indicates that firm’s absorptive capacity negatively affects firms’ innovation when accounted for 
endogeneity.  That is the positive finding between absorptive capacity and innovation in the prior 
literature might be due to other omitted variables in the empirical model (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989).  Thus, when we include the effect of geographic location we find that absorptive capacity 
is negatively related to innovation.   
In support of hypothesis 4, which predicts that that firms’ absorptive capacity positively 
moderates the relationship between firms’ structural holes and innovation, fixed effects model 
with GMM estimation results in Table 9 (Model 1) indicates a significant relationship.  Thus, 
hypothesis 4 is supported when I account for endogeneity by HQ location variable.  However, 
results are not significant when I account for endogeneity with R&D-Lab location variable.  
Although it is not among my hypothesized relationships, in the models where I do not account 
for endogeneity (Models 3 and 4) the coefficient of the structural holes variable indicates a 
positive relationship between firms’ structural holes and the innovation output similar to the 
prior research (Hargaddon and Sutton, 1997).  Yet, the structural holes and innovation 
relationship is not significant in Table 9 (Models 1 and 2) where I account for endogeneity of 
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structural holes variable.  The positive coefficient of my interaction variable- structural holes X 
absorptive capacity indicates a significant and positive moderation of absorptive capacity.  
Interestingly, when I do not account for endogeneity I find that structural holes variable is 
positive and significant in both HQ location and R&D-Lab location models in Table 9 (Models 3 
and 4).  This finding shows that mixed findings related to structural holes and innovation 
relationship in prior literature might be due to the absence of control for endogeneity of 
structural holes.  In testing the hypothesis 4 in order to avoid multicollinearity among variables I 
dropped the indirect ties control variable from my model.  As it is also seen from the correlation 
table (Table 5) the correlation between indirect ties and structural holes variable is significant 
(0.979).  Dropping this variable does not change results as I also discussed earlier the measure 
for structural holes variable already accounts for indirect ties in the entire network. 
As it is also stated above, the interactions of centrality and absorptive capacity and 
structural holes and absorptive capacity are not significant when I account for endogeneity with 
the R&D-Lab location variable.  This finding is interesting and requires further elaboration.  
According to Zahra and George (2002) absorptive capacity can be characterized as potential and 
realized absorptive capacity.  Potential absorptive capacity includes acquisition and assimilation 
of external knowledge.  Realized absorptive capacity includes transformation and exploitation of 
the acquired and assimilated knowledge into commercially viable form.  Combining this view 
with the findings of this study indicates that various units within an organization may house 
either potential absorptive capacity or realized absorptive capacity.  However, sometimes both 
potential and realized absorptive capacity might be housed within the same unit.  In the context 
of the biopharmaceutical industry, firms’ R&D-Laboratories might house potential absorptive 
capacity because potential absorptive capacity is associated with research and development or 
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exploration of new chemical components or new target proteins.  For example, scientists in 
R&D-Laboratories might be interested in developing new chemical compositions and might be 
concerned with the R&D aspect of drug development rather than commercial aspect of it.   
Thus, firm’s absorptive capacity does not moderate the relationship for firm’s centrality and 
structural holes and innovation relationship.  Because, firms’ information benefits acquired by 
their central position or structural holes influenced by their R&D-Lab location might be different 
from information benefits they receive if their headquarters are in a cluster area.  That is, the 
information benefits they receive due to R&D-Lab location might be relevant only to research 
and development and even if firms have absorptive capacity it is les likely that they will convert 
this information into a commercial viable form.  However, in the case of headquarters location it 
is more likely that firms’ absorptive capacity will positively moderate the centrality, structural 
holes, and innovation relationship because headquarters have both potential and realized 
absorptive capacity in place in order to commercialize  information acquired due to centrality 
and structural holes firms have in their alliance network structure. 
5.2 INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS 
Several aspects of the above results are worth inquiring further.  First, in order to test hypothesis 
1 I used a negative binomial model which is a non-linear, exponential model.  Many count data 
models, such as negative binomial model use the general exponential form of: 
 E[y|x] = exp(xβ+ ε), and the estimated coefficients should be interpreted as semi-elasticity 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, pp. 124).  This indicates that one unit change in the independent 
variable, x results in 100 X β % change in the dependent variable, y (Stock and Watson, 2003, 
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pp. 211).  Accordingly, in the HQ model in Table 6 (Model 1) the positive coefficient (0.309) for 
hypothesis 1 denotes that in-cluster firms increase their number of alliances by approximately 31 
percentage points more than out-cluster firms’ increase.  For example, if out-cluster firm (firm’s 
HQ is out cluster) increases its number of alliances by 10%, then an in-cluster firm (firm’s HQ is 
in cluster) increases its number of alliances by 41%.  
Second, interpretation of coefficient in hypothesis 2 in Table 7 (Model 1) is straight 
forward as I have a linear relationship between independent and dependent variable.  Therefore, 
the difference in the structural holes variables between in-cluster and out-cluster firms is 0.146.  
For example, if a firm that is located outside of a cluster and has a structural holes (calculated as 
an efficiency index) of 0.15, the structural holes (efficiency index) of an in-cluster firm is 0.30.  
In other words in-cluster firm spans more structural holes than out-cluster firm does.  The higher 
structural holes (efficiency index) value means that firms span many structural holes; value of 1 
in structural holes (efficiency index) denotes that partners of a focal firm do not have 
connections with each other, indicating that focal firm does not have any redundant contact.  The 
interpretation of coefficients in R&D-Lab location model is also similar to the above 
interpretations. 
Finally, models for hypothesis 3 and 4 also employ an exponential relationship.  
Interpreting coefficients requires a similar logic to above exponential interpretation for 
hypothesis 1.  For example, hypothesis 3 predicts that absorptive capacity positively moderates 
the relationship between centrality and patents.  The coefficient on the interaction term, 
centrality X absorptive capacity is the effect of a unit increase in centrality and absorptive 
capacity, above and beyond the sum of the individual effects of a unit increase in centrality alone 
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and a unit increase in absorptive capacity alone (Stock and Watson, 2003, pp.211-229).  Since I 
have an exponential model I present the equation in a general log-linear form as:   
Δ Log (patent) = [β1 + β3 (absorptive capacity)] Δ (centrality) + [β2 + β3 (centrality)] Δ 
(absorptive capacity) + β3 Δ (centrality) Δ (absorptive capacity)];   
where, β1= coefficient of centrality, β2 = coefficient of absorptive capacity, β3 = coefficient 
of interaction term. 
Let us take the HQ model (Model 1, Table 8) and suppose, a firm has 3 alliances and its 
absorptive capacity is 0.15 and let’s increase centrality by 1 unit and absorptive capacity by 0.1 
unit, then the effect of interaction between its centrality and absorptive capacity on number of 
patents will be calculated as follows:  
Δ log (patent) = [0.3 + (0.001) (0.15)] (1) + [(-0.012) + (0.001) (3)] (0.1) + (0.001) (1) (0.1)   
Δ log (patent) = [0.30] 
Thus, using the above semi-elasticity interpretation, there will be a 30% increase in the 
number of patents as a result of the interaction effect.  If there were no interaction between the 
centrality and absorptive capacity variables based on 1 unit change in centrality and 0.1 unit 
change in absorptive capacity then the change in patent will be: 
Δ log (patent) = [β1centrality + β2absorptive capacity] 
Δ log (patent) = 0.3(1) + (-0.012) (0.1) = 0.29; 29% change in patents.  Thus, the positive 
interaction between centrality and absorptive capacity brings an additional 1 percentage points 
change in number of patents. 
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6.0  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this study I examine the endogenous impact of cluster membership defined as the 
geographical location of a firm within a cluster area on firms’ alliance network structure and how 
this alliance network structure influences innovation contingent on firms’ absorptive capacity.  I 
find that firms’ headquarters location (or at least one R&D-Lab) inside a cluster affects firms’ 
position in their overall alliance network.  In-cluster firms are more central and span more 
structural holes than other firms (for illustrations see Figures 3 and 4).  Thus, the results provide 
support for the basic premise that network position can be enhanced by locating firms’ 
headquarters (or at least one R&D-Lab) in a cluster area.  Further, my findings suggest that 
network structure is necessary but not a sufficient condition for innovation.  Specifically, firms 
need to have developed capabilities to acquire, assimilate, transform, and commercialize external 
information that is acquired through their network structure.  These results have important 
theoretical, empirical and practical implications.  
First, researchers have found that location in geographical clusters to be important for 
strategic choices of firms (Porter, 1998; Saxenian, 1994; Furman, 2003).  The importance of 
clusters has mainly evolved around two main arguments.  On one hand, firms located within 
cluster areas have benefits of physical location and the resources associated with it.  On the other 
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hand, location within a cluster provides free spillover benefits but these spillovers are limited to 
firms within cluster boundaries.  One important implication of these arguments is that it is not 
clear whether in-cluster location substitutes for or complements firm strategic choices such as 
alliances.  These arguments are tested in the context of the biopharmaceutical industry because 
this industry is a knowledge based industry and there are geographical boundaries associated 
with knowledge spillovers, therefore, biopharmaceutical firms are clustered in certain geographic 
areas.  These cluster areas include major research universities and other institutions such as 
government institutions, other biopharmaceutical firms.  Given the clustering effects in the 
biopharmaceutical industry one would expect that biopharmaceutical firms that are located 
within cluster areas do not form alliances with other firms.  In spite of cluster benefits, both 
research and practice show that biopharmaceutical industry is one of the most alliance intensive 
industries due to the high cost of bringing a new biopharmaceutical product into the market.  
Particularly, alliances between a large pharmaceutical firm and a small biotech firm are initiated 
through personal relationships which are facilitated by proximity.  
Further, contrary to the popular belief that geography does not matter due to the advanced 
communication technology, I find that it does matter.  My findings show that firms’ location 
within a cluster area does not substitute for firms’ strategic choices specifically their alliance 
strategies.  This finding is reasonable given that innovation is more likely to be an outcome of 
formal alliance rather than outcome of knowledge spillovers in the cluster areas.  This can be 
attributed to intellectual property rights.  Because firms protect their technology or processes by 
a legal process and thereby firms cannot simply use the same free knowledge spillover to 
innovate.   Further, my results provide a positive answer to a question of whether firms’ R&D 
alliances are a complement to geographic location (Aharonson, Baum, and Feldman, 2004). 
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Furthermore, my study examines the consequences of location across 12 clusters in the 
US.  Previous literature has focused on one cluster area in studying the effects of cluster 
membership (Saxenian, 1994, Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004).  Thus, my study presents a more 
general test of the role of cluster membership by examining location in multiple clusters over 
multiple time periods.  By incorporating appropriate statistical technique to account for each 
network structure variable I obtain robust results.  For example, the centrality data shows a 
negative binomial distribution, which requires to use negative binomial model in order to test my 
first hypothesis including the centrality- innovation relationship.   
Second, I theoretically argue and empirically demonstrate that the strategic choice of 
alliance network structure is an endogenous phenomenon with respect to cluster membership.  
Although prior literature indicates that alliance network structure have significant innovation 
outcomes (Ahuja, 2000; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004), these studies are based on the premise 
that network structure is exogenous (Reagans et al. 2005).  That is, some organizational 
outcomes are regressed on firms’ network structure variables and results are interpreted as the 
effect of network structure on these performance variables.  My results suggest that the 
relationships may be even more complex than I initially believed them to be and may be affected 
by other firm attributes.  My findings indicate that theorizing and then empirically testing 
network structure as an endogenous phenomenon with respect to cluster membership and its 
innovation implications has important consequences for the empirical conclusions based on prior 
theoretical propositions.  Specifically, I find that taking this endogeneity into account might 
change the relationship in which performance is examined to be an outcome of alliance network 
structure (Shaver, 1998; Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003).   
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Since it has been extensively studied in prior research I do not hypothesize for the effect 
of main variables- centrality and structural holes- on innovation in my study.  However, in the 
first part of my theoretical model (cluster membership and network structure relationship) I 
develop my theory arguing the endogenous nature of alliance network structure with respect to 
cluster membership.  I also confirm the endogeneity of these main variables in my empirical 
models.  In order to demonstrate the differences between traditional analysis and my analysis, I 
estimate two models: one that accounts for endogeneity and another that does not account for 
endogeneity.  Based on the comparison of two models I find that even when I account for 
endogeneity I still find a significant effect for the centrality and innovation relationship.  This 
also confirms prior findings in which firm centrality is found to have a significant effect on 
innovation.  Thus, I conjecture that the effect of centrality on firm innovation is very strong that 
even when I account for endogeneity of centrality with respect to cluster membership I still find 
a positive and significant effect.  Therefore, I can confidently say that prior literature’s results 
hold in terms of direction but might differ in terms of magnitude of this effect when I control for 
the endogeneity of firms’ centrality in their alliance network structure.   
In contrast to prior literature (Ahuja, 2000; Hargaddon and Sutton, 1997), the effect of 
firms’ structural holes on innovation is not significant when I control for endogeneity of 
structural holes variable.  This finding is important given the mixed findings for the structural 
holes and innovation relationship in the prior literature.  I contemplate that mixed findings in the 
prior literature might be largely due to treatment of structural holes as an exogenous 
phenomenon.  In particular, the structural holes and innovation relationship might be largely 
influenced by firm specific attributes such as firms’ geographic location as demonstrated in this 
study.  This shows us that the significant effect of structural holes on innovation might result 
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from firm specific factors rather than structural holes.  For example, in the context of 
biopharmaceutical clusters, firms might benefit from existing diverse information within the 
cluster boundaries (free knowledge spillover) even if this firm does not have any formal alliances 
with other organizations.  In prior studies it is impossible to separate between firm attributes and 
alliance effects on firms’ innovation.  As in this study once we separate the effect of firm 
attributes and structural holes spanned in the alliance network structure we find that structural 
holes do not have a significant effect on firms’ innovation.  Another possible explanation to this 
finding is that firms’ network positions attributes such as structural holes limit opportunities 
available to firms because these firms are focused on getting diverse information from their 
network position rather than focusing on other opportunities that exist around them such as being 
a cluster member.  Stuart (1998) also supports this explanation because he concludes that firms’ 
position in their network structure create and limit firms’ abilities to implement alliance 
strategies successfully.  
 Third, my findings also show how network structure and absorptive capacity 
interact.  Supporting prior findings I find that absorptive capacity positively moderates the 
relationship for centrality and innovation and also the relationship for structural holes and 
innovation.  These findings are interesting because prior literature has focused on the moderating 
effect of absorptive capacity in explaining innovation without addressing whether the effect 
might depend on other firm attributes (McEvily and Yao, 2005; Tsai, 2001).  In this study, I 
examine one such firm attribute: the cluster membership.  I find that after accounting for this 
attribute I find positive and significant results for the moderating effect of absorptive capacity for 
network structure and innovation relationship.   
 61
Cluster membership may enhance firms’ network structure thereby increasing the volume 
and diversity of information a firm can access but at the same time firms need absorptive 
capacity to acquire, assimilate and exploit external information in order to innovate.  Indeed, 
according to an industry survey, biopharmaceutical firms choose their alliance partners based on 
their expertise area.  For example, biopharmaceutical executives consider the talent and 
knowledge base of their alliance partners in their own therapeutic area as very important in 
choosing their alliance partner (Deloitte Research Life Science Study, 2005).  My informal 
interview with biopharmaceutical industry expert also confirms the above point.  As he stated, it 
is not the financial resources but it is the human capital and absorptive capacity limitations of 
firms that keep biopharmaceutical firms from being more innovative.  In particular, 
biopharmaceutical firms’ absorptive capacity positively interacts with firms’ information 
benefits they acquire due to their alliance network position in two ways.  First, firms’ experience 
in a certain therapeutic area will motivate the biopharmaceutical firm to further extract value 
from this experience by using the high amount of information volume acquired due to its central 
position in its alliance network structure.  Second, absorptive capacity of a biopharmaceutical 
firm that spans many structural holes, thereby has access to diverse information, will enable but 
also limit this biopharmaceutical firm to choose from diverse information that might be related to 
various therapeutic areas and built on the similar therapeutic area.   
 Finally, emphasizing endogeneity of key network structure dimensions reminds us that 
firms’ strategic choice of alliance network structure is dependent upon firm characteristics.  
Firms may manipulate their network positions based on their external environment (Koka, 
Madhavan, Prescott, 2006).  Given that firms’ location might bring advantages (or 
disadvantages) in terms of alliance opportunities it is natural to conclude that firms’ location 
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affect their alliance strategies thereby their alliance network structure.  Out-cluster (or non-
member) firms might access cluster resources through different ways such as direct investment 
acquisition, or alliance (Tallman et all, 2005).  Indeed, my anecdotal evidence suggests that a 
biopharmaceutical company located in Florida specifically forms alliances with other institutions 
in Boston area in order to have access to ongoing cutting edge research in Boston cluster. 
6.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
As with any study, my research has limitations.  Although I included the entire 
biopharmaceutical clusters in the US I did not control for cluster specific factors in my model.  
Future research could examine differences across clusters and how these differences affect firms’ 
network structure.  For example, a firm located in Boston cluster might differ in terms of 
strategic actions it takes compared to a firm located in Seattle cluster due to resources associated 
with clusters and cluster size.  Similarly, future research could explore why approximately 50% 
of firms are still located outside of cluster areas given research showing the benefits of clusters.  
More specifically, what are the determinants of cluster membership?  For example, Eli Lilly is 
located outside of any cluster why did a cluster not start where Eli Lilly is located?  
Perhaps another limitation is my restriction of alliance network to include R&D alliances 
only.  In this study I examined the effect of cluster membership on firms R&D alliances.  Prior 
literature has mainly associated firms’ innovation as an outcome of their R&D alliances (Ahuja, 
2000).  Following the prior literature I also limit my alliance to only R&D alliances given that 
my dependent variable is innovation. Future research might also explore if cluster membership is 
associated with other types of alliances for example, commercial alliances. 
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In this study I used firms’ R&D intensity to measure absorptive capacity.  There has been 
some debate surrounding the issue of using R&D intensity as an indicator of absorptive capacity 
(for a review, see Lane et. al., 2006).  The conclusion of this debate has been that absorptive 
capacity is contextual and it should be measured not only by R&D but also by other proxies that 
capture different dimensions of this construct.  In the biopharmaceutical industry context firms’ 
R&D intensity is an indication of firms’ ability to engage in basic research and applied research, 
which essentially reflects firms’ absorptive capacity.  Although R&D intensity seems to be an 
appropriate measure of absorptive capacity in this particular setting future studies ought to 
examine whether other proxies can be used in testing the moderating effect of absorptive 
capacity for the network structure and innovation relationship in a similar fashion.  For example, 
number of PhD scientists in a biopharmaceutical industry maybe used as a proxy for absorptive 
capacity in this context. 
 Testing for endogeneity in this study has focused on the endogeneity due to 
omitted variable bias and unobserved firm effects.  Nonetheless, innovation might also affect 
firms’ network structure indicating endogeneity due to recursive relationship between a 
dependent variable and an independent variable.  For example, Shipilov (2006) tests for 
recursive relationship between performance and network structure in the investment banking 
industry and finds that network structure is not endogenous with respect to a recursive 
relationship between market share (as a proxy for performance) and network structure.  
However, I am confident that given my theoretical boundary and methodological approach, the 
endogeneity problem due to recursive relationship between dependent variable and independent 
variable is mitigated in my model.  In a similar vein, one may argue that cluster membership is 
not entirely exogenous or put differently, endogeneity bias may be associated with cluster 
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membership as well.  That is, firms choose their location and there are strategic factors 
influencing this location choice.  Because of this study’s theoretical boundary, however, I start 
with firms’ given geographic location and study the influence of this location for strategic 
actions.  Additional studies could also investigate the endogenous nature of cluster membership 
and how this affects firms’ innovation. 
 Another intriguing area for future research might be to consider the relationship 
between firms’ cluster membership and their absorptive capacity.  This question assumes 
importance because I find that firms’ absorptive capacity does not significantly moderate the 
network structure and innovation relationship when I do not account for endogeneity with cluster 
membership.  Thus, does it mean that there is an effect of cluster membership on firms’ 
absorptive capacity?  Relevant to above question, another question one can further pursue is does 
cluster membership have similar effects on firms’ potential and realized absorptive capacity 
(Zahra and George, 2002)? 
In spite of these qualifications, this study contributes to the body of research examining the 
impact of firm’s geographic location on strategic actions particularly alliance network structure, 
geographic clusters, and the firm’s innovation performance (Sorenson and Baum, 2003; Owen-
Smith and Powell, 2004; Tallman et al. 2004).  It points to the possibility that firms’ position in 
their alliance network structure is determined by these firms’ location within a cluster area.  
Executives’ failure to recognize the importance of geographic location for alliance building 
strategies could result in strategic actions that might be detrimental for their firms’ alliance 
building actions and in turn innovation performance.  However, I cautiously invite managers that 
before they take any strategic actions relevant to relocation the feasibility of such action should 
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be analyzed.  If communication costs or other relevant costs of managing alliances exceed the 
costs of relocation, it might be feasible to relocate. 
 
Figure 1.  Research Model
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Figure 2.  Biopharmaceutical Cluster Areas in the US 
 
 
Clusters are identified based on the Milken Study, 2004:  Seattle, Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose, Los Angeles, San Diego, Orange County, Austin, Raleigh-
Durham-Chapel Hill, Washington DC, Philadelphia, Boston
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Figure 3.  Ego network of an in-cluster firm:  Vertex Pharmaceutical 
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Figure 4.  Ego network of an out-cluster firm:  Penwest Pharmaceutical 
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Table 1.  A Summary of Hypothesized Relationships in the Study 
 
Hypotheses Relationship Theoretical Framework  
 
H1a 
 
 
H1b 
 
 
In-cluster firms are more central in their alliance network than firms located 
elsewhere.   
 
In-cluster firms are less central in their alliance network than firms located 
elsewhere. 
 
Economic Geography: Space and 
Place Arguments 
Transaction Costs 
Resource Complementarities 
Embeddedness 
 
H2a 
 
 
H2b 
 
In-cluster firms span more structural holes in their alliance network than firms 
located elsewhere.  
 
In-cluster firms span fewer structural holes in their alliance networks than 
firms located elsewhere. 
 
Economic Geography: Space and 
Place Arguments 
Transaction Costs 
Resource Complementarities 
Embeddedness 
 
H3 
 
Given the endogeneity of firms’ centrality in their alliance network structure 
with respect to their cluster membership, firms’ absorptive capacity positively 
moderates the relationship between firms’ centrality in their alliance networks 
and innovation 
 
Social Capital 
Absorptive Capacity 
Bounded Rationality 
 
H4 
 
Given the endogeneity of firms’ structural holes in their alliance network 
structure with respect to their cluster membership, firms’ absorptive capacity 
positively moderates the relationship between firms’ structural holes in their 
alliance networks and innovation. 
 
 
Social Capital 
Absorptive Capacity 
Bounded Rationality 
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Table 2.  Variable Labels and Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable  
Patent Yearly count of patents granted 
Independent Variables  
HQ location 
Dummy variable, 1 = firm’s headquarter location is in cluster area, 0= otherwise.  i.e. if firm is a cluster 
member 
R&D-Lab location 
Dummy variable, 1 = firm has at least 1 R&D-Lab location in cluster area, 0= otherwise.  i.e. if firm is a 
cluster member 
Endogenous Variables  
Centrality Degree centrality, number of alliances in alliance network 
Centrality X Absorptive capacity Interaction between centrality and Absorptive capacity 
Structural Holes 
Measure of structural holes, Ratio of nonredundant contacts to total contacts, calculated by UCINET 6, 
efficiency index. 
Structural holes X Absorptive capacity Interaction between structural holes and Absorptive capacity 
Control Variables  
Absorptive capacity  R&D expenditure over assets, measure for absorptive capacity 
Firm Size Log (number of employees), control for firm size 
Firm age  Age in years since founding 
Indirect ties 
Measure of indirect ties in the entire network. Calculated based on reach centrality measure in 
UCINET 6 
Time effects Measure of time related effects in the model.  Dummy variable 
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Table 3.  Geographic Summary of Sample 
 
Location (MSA) n= number of firms 
 
Boston 
San Diego 
San Jose 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill 
Philadelphia 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett 
San Francisco 
Washington, DC 
Oakland, CA 
Los Angeles-Long-Beach 
Orange County 
Austin-San Marcos 
Out Cluster Firms 
 
15 
9 
4 
5 
8 
4 
18 
3 
0* 
1 
5 
0* 
75 
Total: 12 Clusters 147 Firms 
* Among 147 firms in our sample no firm is located in Oakland or Austin-San Marcos
Table 4.  Sample characteristics based on In-Cluster and Out-Cluster Firmsa 
 
 
Average 
HQ-IN 
Stdev 
HQ-IN 
Average  
HQ-OUT 
Stdev 
HQ-Out 
HQ:IN-
HQ:OUT 
t-test 
Average 
R&D-LAB-
IN 
Stdev 
R&D-LAB-
IN 
Average 
R&D-LAB-
OUT 
Stdev 
R&D-LAB-
OUT 
R&D-LAB:IN-
R&D-LAB:OUT 
t-test 
Patents 33 78.5 94 281.0 000*** 63 182.6 67 244.6 0.77
Centrality 7.15 8.93 8.47 16.56 0.15 9.26 13.22 6.04 13.58 0.0005***
Structural holes  0.92 0.23 0.76 0.41 000*** 0.92 0.24 0.74 0.42 000***
Asset 346.87 1055.3 3,991.42 12,189.4 000*** 2,572.4 1,046.8 1,827.69 6,700.0 0.23
Sale 141.86 446.3 2,888.18 8,273.0 000*** 1,680,44 6,416.3 1,433.65 5,751.1 0.56
R&D Exp 53.2 98.7 369 1,118.9 000*** 261.42 961.11 161.98 606.7 0.08*
Absorptive 
Capacity 23.93 94.3 4.41 35.9 000*** 24.35 93.53 0.32 0.52 000***
Firm age 14 10.0 24 24.6 000*** 18 21 21 19 0.03**
Employee 656 1860.6 8,388 22,137.8 000*** 5,529 19,169 3,605 12,168 0.16
Indirect ties 0.937 0.235 0.769 0.417 000***
 
0.930 0.246 0.748 0.431 000***
Observations 406  441 474 373
 
No of firms 
 
75 
(51%) 
  
72 
(49%)
 
85 
(57%) 
62 
(43%)
a This table also illustrates how looking at and driving conclusions about the relationships among variables based on  raw sample characteristics might 
be misleading in the empirical research.  This table is based on the static analysis of data with the normality assumption.  However, data for several of the 
variables in this study are not normal and relationships among variables change once I specify regression models based on the correct distribution of data.  
Results of our regression analysis includes the effect of several independent and control variables on the dependent variable while accounting for endogeneity of 
variables, unobserved effects over time and associated time effects.
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Table 5.  Summary Statistics and Correlations for the period 1998- 2004 
 
 Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Patent 847 64.73 212.0 0 1624 1           
2 HQ location 847 0.48 0..499 0 1 -0.144* 1          
3 R&D-Lab location  847 0.56 0.496 0 1 -0.009 0.775* 1         
4 Centrality 847 7.84 13.47 0 100 0.828* -0.048 0.118* 1        
5 
Centrality X 
Absorptive capacity 847 32.48 608.1 -4464.68 10456.74 -0.261* 0.096* 0.012 -0.133* 1       
6 Structural holes 847 0.84 0.35 0 1 0.109* 0.239* 0.260* 0.222* -0.050 1      
7 
Structural holes X 
Absorptive capacity  847 1.73 10.37 -20.51 106.42 -0.088* -0.001 0.030 -0.076* 0.065 -0.374* 1     
8 Absorptive capacity 847 13.77 70.95 0 697.94 -0.043 0.137* 0.168* 0.034 0.125* 0.070* 0.865* 1    
9 Firm size 847 2.26 1.02 0 5.09 0.566* -0.200* 0.019 0.598* -0.168* 0.099* -0.066 -0.019 1   
10 Firm age 847 19 19.8 1 118 0.575* -0.266* -0.07 0.504* -0.171* 0.020 -0.079* -0.082* 0.610* 1  
11 Indirect ties 847 0.85 0.35 0 0.99 0.103* 0.238* 0.257* 0.226* -0.046 0.979* -0.362* 0.076* 0.094* 0.020* 1 
 
*p<0.05
Table 6.  Hypothesis 1:  Cluster membership and centrality relationship  
Dependent Variable (DV): Centrality 
Random Effect Negative Binomial Model 
Variables Model 1:HQ  Model 2: R&D-LAB  
Independent Variables    
HQ location 
0.309* 
(0.151)  
R&D-Lab location  
0.346*    
(0.151) 
Control Variables    
Absorptive capacity 
0.0000894 
(0.00033) 
0.00007   
(0 .0003) 
Firm size 
0.375*** 
(0.0732) 
0.354***   
(0.074) 
Firm Age 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.015***    
(0.005) 
Indirect ties 
4.197*** 
(0.489) 
4.195*** 
(0.488) 
Time effects Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -1610.72 -1610.21 
Wald Chi2  495.77*** 496.05*** 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
†p<0.10 
*p<0.05 
**p<0.01 
***p<0.001 
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Table 7.  Hypothesis 2:  Cluster membership and structural holes relationship  
Dependent Variable (DV): Structural holes 
Random Effect Generalized Least Squares (GLS) Model  
Variables Model 1: HQ 
Model 2:R&D-
LAB 
Independent Variables    
HQ location 
0.146***   
(0.037)  
R&D-Lab location   
0.149*** 
(0.045) 
Control Variables    
Absorptive capacity 
0.00012† 
(0.000065) 
0.00013** 
(0.00005) 
Firm size 
0.0375 
(0.0229) 
0.031 
(0.0223) 
Firm Age 
0.0018 
(0.0012) 
0.0006 
(0.001) 
Indirect ties Dropped Dropped 
Time effects Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.67 0.672 
Wald Chi2 45.52*** 50.10*** 
†We do not control for the effect of indirect ties in this model because the structural holes measure we use 
already includes the effect of indirect ties.  
Coefficient 
(Standard Errors) 
†p<0.10 
*p<0.05 
**p<0.01 
***p<0.001 
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Table 8.  Hypothesis 3:  Centrality and patent relationship 
Dependent Variable (DV): Patent 
Fixed Effects Model with Endogenous Regressors with Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation for count DV 
 
Fixed Effects Model with 
endogenous regressors with 
GMM estimation for count 
DV:  Models account for 
endogeneity 
Random Effects Negative 
Binomial Model:  Models do not 
account for endogeneity 
Variables Model 1: HQ 
Model 2: 
R&D-LAB  Model 3: HQ 
Model 4: 
R&D-LAB 
Endogenous Variables      
Centrality 
0.3* 
(0.138) 
0.04* 
(0.017) 
0.007* 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
Centrality X 
Absorptive capacity 
0.001† 
(0.0005) 
0.0006 
(0.006) 
-0.00003 
(0.00005) 
-0.00002 
(0.00005) 
 Independent Variables      
Absorptive capacity 
-0.012* 
(0.004) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
Firm size 
0.607 
(2.89) 
1.44* 
(0.573) 
0.138† 
(0.083) 
0.104 
(0.084) 
Firm age 
-0.103 
(0.083) 
-0.04† 
(0.024) 
-0.004 
(0.0043) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
Indirect ties 
0.036 
(18) 
0.03 
(3) 
0.310* 
(0.147) 
0.371* 
(0.149) 
GMM Objective 
Functiona 0.07 0.03 NA NA 
HQ   
0.574*** 
(0.153)  
R&D-Lab location    
0.087 
(0.147) 
Log Likelihood   -2858.66 -2865.4217 
aGMM objective function is calculated by the optimization program in Gauss Software.  The closer the 
function to zero the better the model fit is. 
Coefficient 
(Standard Errors) 
†p<0.10 
*p<0.05 
**p<0.01 
***p<0.001 
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Table 9.  Hypothesis 4:  Structural holes and patent relationship 
Dependent Variable (DV): Patent 
Fixed Effects Model with Endogenous Regressors with Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
Estimation for Count DV 
 
Fixed Effects Model with 
endogenous regressors with 
GMM estimation for count 
DV:  Models account for 
endogeneity 
Random Effects Negative 
Binomial Model:  Model does 
not account for endogeneity 
Variables 
Model 1: 
HQ 
Model 2: R&D-
LAB  Model 3: HQ 
Model 4: 
R&D-LAB 
Endogenous Variables      
Structural holes 
0.163 
(3.326) 
0.422 
(602) 
0.352† 
(0.211) 
0.400† 
(0.216) 
Structural holes X 
Absorptive capacity 
0.048** 
(0.017) 
0.009 
(45) 
-0.0005 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
Control Variables      
Absorptive capacity 
-0.02*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(6.66) 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
0.0007 
(0.001) 
Firm size 
0.49 
(0.616) 
-0.517† 
(0.290) 
0.198** 
(0.080) 
0.177* 
(0.081) 
Firm age 
0.046† 
(0.031) 
-0.084*** 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
Indirect tiesa Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
GMM Objective 
Functionb 0.06 0.07 NA NA 
HQ location   
0.569*** 
(0.155)  
R&D-Lab location    
0.026 
(0.151) 
Log Likelihood   -2861.19 -2867.83 
aWe do not control for the effect of indirect ties in this model because the structural holes measure we use already 
includes the effect of indirect ties.  In addition, the structural holes and indirect ties variables are highly correlated.   
bGMM objective function is calculated by the optimization program in Gauss Software.  The closer the function to 
zero the better the model fit is.  
Coefficient 
(Standard Errors) 
†p<0.10 
*p<0.05 
**p<0.01 
***p<0.001 
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APPENDIX 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS FOR DISSERTATION  
 
 Table 10.  Sample Distribution based on In and Out Cluster Identification  
72 3 R&D-LAB**   
13 59 IN OUT   
IN 
 
Acadia 
Acsuphere 
Adolor 
Advancis 
Aeolus 
Alkermes 
Allergen* 
Amylin 
Arena 
ArQule 
Auxilium 
Avanir 
Biomarin 
Cardiotech 
Cell genesys 
Cell therapeutics 
Cephalon* 
Chiron* 
Collagenex 
Connetics 
Corcept 
Corgentech 
Cortex 
Critical therapeutic 
Cubist 
Cytokinetics 
Dendreon 
Depomed 
Durect 
Dusa pharna 
Dynavax 
Edwrds life sci 
Ergo sci 
Genentech* 
GenVec 
Geron 
Icagen 
ICOS 
IMCOR Immunicon 
ImmuniGen 
Indevus 
InSite 
Inspire 
InterMune 
Intrabiotics 
ISIS pharma 
ISTA pharma 
Ligand 
MacroChem 
MannKind 
Maxim 
Metabasis 
NAstech 
Nektar Therapeutics 
Northwest 
Pain therap 
Pharmacyslics 
Pozen 
Praecis 
Questcor 
regeneRX 
Renovis 
Salix 
Select 
Spectrum 
superGen 
united therapeutics 
Valeant* 
Vertex 
ViroPharma 
Vyrex 
Boston life sci 
Endo pharma 
Introgen 
 
  75  
HQ 
OUT 
 
Abbott* 
Alexion 
Eyetch 
Johnosn & Johnson* 
Kos pharma 
MGI pharma 
Myriad 
Pfizer* 
Schering Plough* 
Sentigen 
Sirna 
Tanox 
Wyeth* 
   Aastrom 
Access  
Advanced V.R. 
Akorn Inc 
Allos Therap 
Alpharma* 
Alteon 
Amarillo 
Americam Pharma 
Array biopharma 
Avi biopharma 
Axonyx 
Bentley 
Biodelivery 
Biosante 
Bradley 
Bristol-MS 
Carrington 
Chattem 
Columbia labs 
Cortech 
Derma sciences 
DOR biopharma 
DOV Pharma 
Emisphere Tech 
eXegenics 
Fist horizon 
Forest labs* 
Inhibitex 
Insmed 
Interpharm 
IOMED 
Ivax* 
Keryx 
King* 
Large Scale biology 
Eli Lilly* 
Manhattan pharma 
Medicis pahrma* 
Memory pharma 
Merck inc* 
Miravant 
Mylan* 
Neurogen 
New river pharma 
Nexmed 
Noven 
Oxis 
Par pharma 
Penwest 
Perrigo 
PML 
Progenics 
Regeneron 
SIGA 
Theragenics 
Vribac 
Watson* 
Zila 
72  
  85 62 147  
* Established Firms:  Assets over 1Billion;  **83% of firms have R&D facility at HQ location 
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Figure 5.  Descriptive Data Analysis- Average Patents per year 
In and Out Cluster Comparison based on Average No of 
Patents Granted
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In-Patent: Average no of patents granted for in- cluster firms 
Out-Patent: Average no of patents granted for out- cluster firms 
Patent is measured by the count of number of patents granted for each firm 
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Figure 6.  Descriptive Data Analysis- Average Centrality per year 
 
In and Out Cluster Comparison based on Centrality
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In-Centrality: Average centrality of in- cluster firms 
Out-Centrality: Average centrality of out- cluster firms 
Centrality is measured by the count of number of alliances for each firm 
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Figure 7.  Descriptive Data Analysis- Average Structural Holes per yearb 
 
In and Out Cluster Comparison based on Structural Holes
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In-Struc-Holes: Average structural holes for in-cluster firms 
Out-Struc-Holes: Average structural holes for in-cluster firms 
Structural holes is measured by the efficiency index which is calculated by UCINET 6 
 
bImportant Note:  Figures 5, 6, and 7 are merely the descriptive representations of average data for patents, centrality, and structural holes respectively.  Averages 
are calculated based on 147 firms’ data.  For example, average structural holes in 1998 represent the average structural holes of 147 firms in the sample, in 1998.  
These figures do not represent the hypothesized relationships that are identified in my study.  Also, please see footnote of Table 4. 
Biopharmaceutical clusters in the US based on the Milken Institute study (2004) 
 
In this study I use the cluster identification of the Milken Institute, America’s Biotech 
and Life Science Clusters, 2004 study. 
Milken study defines clusters as “geographic concentrations of sometimes competing, 
sometimes collaborating firms, and their related supplier network.  A cluster represents 
an entire value chain of a broadly defined industry sector from suppliers to end products, 
including its related suppliers and specialized infrastructure.” (Milken Institute 
America’s Biotech and Life Sciences Clusters, pg. 1). 
Milken Institute identifes 12 biopharmaceutical clusters based on the 
specialization and concentration of biopharmaceutical industry in the United States.  The 
identification of clusters is based on Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).  MSA is 
defined as “An area containing a recognized population nucleus and adjacent 
communities that have a high degree of integration with that nucleus” (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2000).  MSAs are used widely to define the industry 
boundaries.  For example in a recent study Miller and Eden used MSAs (2006) in order to 
define local density of commercial banks in a geographic area. 
The Milken study also compares the relative strength of these top 12 clusters 
including each MSA’s research and development (R&D) dollar per capita, NSF research 
funding to Biotech, NIH funding to metro cities, NIH funding to institutes, NIH funding 
to research universities, Biotech R&D assets, Biotech VC investment growth, number of 
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biotech firms receiving VC. Biotech patents issued biotech patent citations, business 
starts, biotech graduate students, Biotech PhDs awarded, bachelor degrees granted in 
biotech field, number of PhD granting institutions, biotech scientist, biomedical 
engineers, intensity of medical scientists, biomedical location quotient, biomedical 
employment size, gross metro product (GMP), and employment  (for a detailed report 
please see Milken Institute America’s Biotech and Life Sciences Clusters, 2004).  Based 
on these criteria, the following table (Table 11) provides the ranking of 
Biopharmaceutical clusters in the US. 
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Table 11.  Biopharmaceutical Cluster in the US 
MSA Rank Composite Score  
San Diego 
Boston 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill 
San Jose 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett 
Washington, DC 
Philadelphia 
San Francisco 
Oakland 
Los Angeles- Long Beach 
Orange County 
Austin-San Marcos 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
100 
95.1 
92.5 
87.8 
83.8 
79.4 
76.5 
75.8 
74.3 
66.5 
54.1 
47.8 
Source:  America’s Biotech and Life Sciences Cluster, Milken Institute, 2004 
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Cluster membership and firm characteristics 
In general, I find that older firms are more likely to be located outside of clusters.  This finding is 
consistent with the intuition that larger firms have necessary resources in place that they might 
not need cluster benefits.  For example, Eli Lilly is located outside of a cluster area but due to its 
size and financial resources Lilly can attract alliance partners even if it is not located in a cluster 
area.  Findings also show that R&D intensity is positively related with the probability of 
biopharmaceutical firms’ location in a cluster area.  This is natural given that biopharmaceutical 
clusters are research intensive areas and firms that are research intensive are more likely to be 
located in these clusters.  
Specifically, I analyzed the effect of following firm attribute variables:   
• age 
• size 
• financial condition, e.g. sales, asset. 
• R&D intensity 
In the analysis, first, I ran a full logit model which estimates the probability of cluster 
membership based on firm characteristics.  Since the correlation between sales and assets are 
high (0.93), I also estimated the model by excluding first the ‘sales’ variable and then excluding 
the ‘asset’ variable, results did not change in any models.  In all models firm age and absorptive 
capacity are significant.  Second, I also conducted post-estimation in STATA and provide the 
outcome of this post-estimation analysis in graphical format. 
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Table 12.  Correlation Table for Firm Attributes  
 
 Asset Sale Firm size Firm age Absorptive 
Capacity 
Asset 1 .9327* .5809* .6458* -0.048 
Sale  1 .6113* .7146* -0.047 
Firm size   1 .6106* -0.019 
Firm age    1 -0.082 
Absorptive 
Capacity 
    1 
*p< .05 
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Table 13.  The relationship between Firm Characteristics and Cluster Membership 
Random-effects logistic regression 
Variables HQ Model R&D-LAB Model 
Assets 
0.0008 
(0.0005) 
0.00016 
(0.00011) 
Sales 
-0.0022 
(0.0014) 
-0.000036 
(0.00012)     
Firm age 
-0.076* 
(0.270) 
-0.061*** 
(0.023)     
Firm size 
-0.090 
(0.374) 
0.262 
(0.400)     
Absorptive capacity 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.495* 
(0.263)      
Time Effects Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -190.60 -192.41 
Wald Chi2 21.46** 10.99** 
No of Observations 847 847 
No of Firms 147 147 
 
Interpretation of Logit coefficients in the table 
According to Wooldridge (Introductory Econometrics, 2003, pg. 561) we can get a rough 
equivalent of a linear probability model coefficient if we multiply the logit coefficient with 0.25 
(or divide by 4).  In this way we make the logit coefficients comparable to linear probability 
model coefficients for easy interpretation.  In the linear probability model the coefficient of the 
independent variable indicates the percentage point change in the probability that dependent 
variable is equal to 1 caused by a one-unit increase in the independent variable (Studenmund, 
Using Econometrics, pg. 448, 2006). 
For example:   logit coefficient of absorptive capacity = 0.008 
  LPM coefficient of absorptive capacity =  (0.008*0.25) = 0.002  
Interpretation: if we increase absorptive capacity by one unit the probability that the firm is a 
cluster member will increase by 0.2 %.   
Figure 8.  Graphical Analysis of Firm Characteristics and Cluster Membership 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by HQ location) 
 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by R&D-Lab location) 
1a. Firm Sales and cluster membership: In the full model this 
relationship is not significant.   
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1a. Firm Sales and cluster membership: In the full model this 
relationship is not significant.  
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Figure 9.  Graphical Analysis of Firm Characteristics and Cluster Membership 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by HQ location) 
 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by R&D-LAB location) 
1b. Firm Assets and cluster membership:  In the full model this 
relationship is not significant.   
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1b. Firm Assets and cluster membership:  In the full model this 
relationship is not significant.   
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Figure 10.  Graphical Analysis of Firm Characteristics and Cluster Membership 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by HQ location) 
 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by R&D-Lab location) 
1c. Firm age (measured in years passed since founding) and cluster 
membership: In the full model this relationship is significant.    
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1c. Firm age (measured in years passed since founding) and cluster 
membership: In the full model this relationship is significant. 
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Figure 11.  Graphical Analysis of Firm Characteristics and Cluster Membership 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by HQ location) 
 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by R&D-LAB location) 
1d. Absorptive capacity (measured in R&D exp/Asset) and cluster 
membership:  In the full model this relationship is significant.   
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1d. Absorptive capacity (measured in R&D exp/Asset) and cluster 
membership:  In the full model this relationship is significant. 
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Figure 12.  Graphical Analysis of Firm Characteristics and Cluster Membership 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by HQ location) 
 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by R&D-LAB location) 
1e. Firm Size (measured in Log of Employee No) and cluster 
membership:  In the full model this relationship is not significant. 
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1e. Firm Size (measured in Log of Employee No) and cluster 
membership:  In the full model this relationship is not significant. 
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Figure 13.  Graphical Analysis of Firm Characteristics and Cluster Membership 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by HQ location) 
 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by R&D-Lab location) 
1a. Firm Sales and cluster membership: In the full model this 
relationship is not significant.   
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1a. Firm Sales and cluster membership: In the full model this 
relationship is not significant.  
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Figure 14.  Graphical Analysis of Firm Characteristics and Cluster Membership 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by HQ location) 
 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by R&D-LAB location) 
1b. Firm Assets and cluster membership:  In the full model this 
relationship is not significant.   
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1b. Firm Assets and cluster membership:  In the full model this 
relationship is not significant.   
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Figure 15.  Graphical Analysis of Firm Characteristics and Cluster Membership 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by HQ location) 
 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by R&D-Lab location) 
1c. Firm age (measured in years passed since founding) and cluster 
membership: In the full model this relationship is significant.    
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1c. Firm age (measured in years passed since founding) and cluster 
membership: In the full model this relationship is significant. 
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Figure 16.  Graphical Analysis of Firm Characteristics and Cluster Membership 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by HQ location) 
 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by R&D-LAB location) 
1d. Absorptive capacity (measured in R&D exp/Asset) and cluster 
membership:  In the full model this relationship is significant.   
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1d. Absorptive capacity (measured in R&D exp/Asset) and cluster 
membership:  In the full model this relationship is significant. 
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Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by HQ location) 
 
Effect of each independent variable on Cluster Membership (measured 
by R&D-LAB location) 
1e. Firm Size (measured in Log of Employee No) and cluster 
membership:  In the full model this relationship is not significant. 
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1e. Firm Size (measured in Log of Employee No) and cluster 
membership:  In the full model this relationship is not significant. 
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Figure 17.  Graphical Analysis of Firm Characteristics and Cluster Membership 
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Test for the endogeneity of network structure variables  
According to the STATA website, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest an augmented 
regression test (Durbin-Wu-Hausman test) to test for endogeneity of variables.  This regression 
includes the residuals of each endogenous right-hand side variable (in our model centrality and 
structural holes), as a function of all exogenous variables (in our model headquarter location-or 
HQ), in a regression of the original model.  
• Test for the endogeneity of centrality variable 
Thus I have the following simultaneous models: 
 
centrality = a0 + a1*HQ + epsilon1 
patent = b0 + b1*centrality + epsilon2 
 
 
centrality = c0 + c1*HQ + epsilon3 
calculate residuals centrality_res, then perform an augmented regression:  
 
patent = d0 + d1*centrality + d2*centrality_res + epsilon4 
 
If d2 is significantly different from zero, then OLS is not consistent. 
 
 
STATA Code for the Test of Endogeneity of centrality  
 
. xtreg centrality HQ 
     
. predict centrality_res, ue  **** ue is the combined residual usubi + esubit**** 
     
. xtreg patent centrality centrality_res 
     
. test centrality_res 
 
 
 
I also ran these cross sectional models for each year.  The results did not change.  
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STATA Program Results 
. xtreg centrality hq 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                    Number of obs      =       847 
Group variable (i): coid                       Number of groups   =       147 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0000                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.0034                                                  avg =       5.8 
       overall = 0.0024                                        max =         7 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                    Wald chi2(1)       =      0.50 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)               Prob > chi2         =    0.4817 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  centrality |      Coef.    Std. Err.   z     P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          hq |   -1.384815   1.968069    -0.70   0.482     -5.24216     2.47253 
       _cons |    7.831387   1.403504     5.58   0.000      5.08057     10.5822 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   11.750155 
     sigma_e |   4.4092397 
         rho |   .87656848   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. predict centrality_re, ue 
 
 102
. xtreg patent centrality  centrality_re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                  Number of obs      =       847 
Group variable (i): coid                         Number of groups   =       147 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0273                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.7365                                            avg =       5.8 
       overall = 0.6789                                     max =         7 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(2)       =    214.94 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                 Prob > chi2         =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      patent |       Coef.   Std. Err.       z     P>|z|    [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  centrality |    39.85584   12.30063     3.24   0.001     15.74705    63.96462 
centrality~e |  -34.01749   12.30735    -2.76   0.006    -58.13945   -9.895523 
       _cons |    -228.298   88.11478    -2.59   0.010    -400.9998   -55.59618 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   88.046837 
     sigma_e |   51.234073 
         rho |   .74704772   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test  centrality_re 
 
 ( 1)  centrality_re = 0 
 
         chi2(  1) =    7.64 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0057 
    
The small p-value indicates that OLS is not consistent, and centrality is an endogenous 
variable. 
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• Test for Endogeneity of Structural holes variable 
. xtreg  Structural holes hq 
  
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       847 
Group variable (i): coid                         Number of groups   =       147 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0000                        Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.0863                                avg  =       5.8 
       overall = 0.0573                                         max =         7 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                    Wald chi2(1)          =     13.56 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                 Prob > chi2            =    0.0002 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Structural holes |       Coef.    Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          hq |     .1733476   .0470774     3.68   0.000     .0810777    .2656176 
       _cons |     .7508496   .0334412    22.45   0.000    .685306    .8163931 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |    .27017211 
     sigma_e |    .20309475 
         rho |   .63894158   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. predict structural holes_re, ue 
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. xtreg  patent  Structural holes  Structural holes_re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                Number of obs        =       847 
Group variable (i): coid                         Number of groups   =       147 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0003                          Obs per group: min  =         2 
       between = 0.0248                                        avg  =       5.8 
       overall = 0.0248                                          max =         7 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(2)      =      3.83 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                 Prob > chi2     =    0.1477 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      patent |        Coef.    Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Structural holes |   -315.8318   177.2812    -1.78   0.075    -663.2966    31.63289 
Structural holes~e |    323.5334   177.5402     1.82   0.068    -24.43901    671.5058 
       _cons |     320.4572   149.5528     2.14   0.032     27.33914    613.5753 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |    184.35748 
     sigma_e |  51.939674 
         rho |                 .92646314   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test  Structural holes_re 
 
 ( 1)  Structural holes_re = 0 
 
           chi2(  1)      =    3.32 
         Prob > chi2  =    0.0684 
 
The small p-value indicates that OLS is not consistent, and structural holes is an endogenous 
variable. 
 
Reference:  
http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/endogeneity.html 
Davidson, R. and J. G. MacKinnon. 1993. Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
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A comparison of this study with a previous study  
Table 14.  Comparison of this study with a prior study by Ahuja (2000) 
 
Study Centrality Structural holes Model 
Ahuja (2000) 0.040*** -0.284*** Poisson 
No account for 
endogeneity 
This Study 0.3** 0.163 Exponential model with 
GMM estimation 
Accounts for endogeneity 
Interpretation 1 unit change in centrality is 
associated with 
100xβcentrality% increase in 
patents 
  
 
The above table shows the difference between two studies.  In my study both centrality and 
structural holes variables are treated as endogenous variables.  In Ahuja (2000) study centrality 
and structural holes variables are treated as exogenous variables.  As it is also seen from the table 
treating network structure variables as endogenous variables changes the direction and 
magnitude of coefficients of these variables in the network structure and innovation model.  We 
should note, however, that this is a rough comparison and other factors such as industry 
differences that might affect this relationship have not been taken into account.  For example, my 
study includes biopharmaceutical industry while Ahuja’s study includes chemical industry. 
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Table 15.  Determinants of R&D Intensity in the Biopharmaceutical Industry 
 
Determinants Literature Review Study 
 
Drug Prices 
 
Drug prices have significant positive effect on firms’ R&D spending in the 
pharmaceutical industry due to demand and cash flow effects. 
 
Giacotto,C;  Santerre, E.R.; and 
Vernon, J. V. ,2005 
 
Expected 
returns and 
cash flows 
 
Expected returns and cash flow are important determinants of firm research 
intensities for a pooled sample of 11 major U.S. drug firms over the period 1974 to 
1994. 
 
Grabowski, H.G., and Vernon, 
J.M. , 2000 
 
Size 
 
While the relationship between firm size and R&D spending has been studied the 
literature a consensus has not been developed.  
 
 
 
According to some researchers R&D spending (measured as patent numbers) 
decreases with firm size while others argue that there is no such effect.   
 
 
There is no relationship between R&D expenditure (measured by the number of 
patents produced per inventor) and firm size in the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Kim, J., Lee, S., Marschke, 
2004, Relation of Firm Size to 
R&D Productivity, working 
paper.   
 
Acs and Audretsch, 1991; 
Bound et al, 1984; and 
Hausman et al, 1984) 
 
 
Lee et. all (2004) 
Determinants of R&D intensity in the biopharmaceutical industry 
 
 
• Company Age and R&D Intensity Relationship 
 
Analysis and Results 
 
Generalized Least Squares Model with unbalanced Panel Data, Time effects included 
 
 Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) 
 
Group variable:   coid                            Number of obs          =       847 
Time variable:    panelyr                         Number of groups     =     147 
Panels:           correlated (unbalanced)     Obs per group: min   =         2 
Autocorrelation:  panel-specific AR(1)                            avg =  5.761905 
Sigma computed by pairwise selection                           max =         7 
Estimated covariances      =     10878            R-squared         =    0.0725 
Estimated autocorrelations =       147            Wald chi2(7)    =     34.00 
Estimated coefficients     =         8            Prob > chi2      =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Panel-corrected 
     rdasset |      Coef.    Std. Err.       z     P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       coage |  -1.204017    .2501161  -4.81    0.000    -1.694236   -.7137988 
        yr99 |   5.672863    6.686047    0.85    0.396    -7.431547   18.77727 
        yr00 |  -5.028853    8.62363    -0.58    0.560    -21.93086   11.87315 
        yr01 |  -.6346234    9.529091   -0.07   0.947    -19.3113     18.04205 
        yr02 |   4.538502    9.915903   0.46    0.647    -14.89631    23.97332 
        yr03 |   4.177401    9.629551   0.43    0.664    -14.69617    23.05097 
        yr04 |   3.566291    9.18051     0.39    0.698    -14.42718    21.55976 
       _cons |  74.08824   15.58379    4.75    0.000     43.54457   104.6319 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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• Company Size (in sales) and R&D Intensity Relationship 
 
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) 
 
Group variable:   coid                             Number of obs      =       847 
Time variable:    panelyr                         Number of groups   =       147 
Panels:           correlated (unbalanced)        Obs per group: min =         2 
Autocorrelation:  panel-specific AR(1)                      avg =  5.761905 
Sigma computed by pairwise selection                      max =         7 
Estimated covariances      =     10878           R-squared          =    0.0626 
Estimated autocorrelations =       147           Wald chi2(7)       =     29.09 
Estimated coefficients     =         8          Prob > chi2        =    0.0001 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |           Panel-corrected 
     rdasset |      Coef.    Std. Err.       z        P>|z|         [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        sale |  -.0017178      .0004608  -3.73     0.000    -.002621   -.0008147 
        yr99 |   4.418202   6.783807     0.65     0.515    -8.877816   17.71422 
        yr00 |  -6.819232   8.909434    -0.77    0.444    -24.2814     10.64294 
        yr01 |  -3.430413   10.02272    -0.34    0.732    -23.07458   16.21376 
        yr02 |   .7167241   10.59516     0.07     0.946    -20.0494    21.48285 
        yr03 |  -.5909473   10.55316    -0.06    0.955    -21.27476   20.09286 
        yr04 |  -2.052498   10.3414      -0.20    0.843    -22.32126   18.21627 
       _cons |   55.77701  12.97459     4.30     0.000     30.34727   81.20674 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Figure 18.  Determinants of R&D Intensity in the Biopharmaceutical Industry Based on the Study Sample 
Generalized Least Squares Model with unbalanced Panel Data, Time effects included 
Coefficient of Company Age is negative and significant 
Coeff: (-1.204*** Std Err: 0.250)  
Coefficient of Company Sales is negative and significant  
(Coeff: -0.001*** Std Er:  0.0004) 
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Figure 19.  Supplemental Data Analysis 
In Cluster and Out Cluster Comparison 
Based on Centrality, Structural Holes and Innovation 
 
Centrality and Patent relationship for Out-cluster (0) and In-cluster (1) 
firms, using data from 1998 to 2004 
Structural Holes (Structural holes Index) and Patent relationship for 
Out-cluster (0) and In-cluster (1) firms, using data from 1998 to 2004 
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Figure 20.  Supplemental Data Analysis: Centrality and Patents8 
 
Annual Data Analysis 
1= Data for the year 1999  
0= Data for all other years, except 1999 
1=  Data for the year 2000 
0= Data for all other years, except 2000 
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Figure 21.  Supplemental Data Analysis: Centrality and Patents 
 
Annual Data Analysis 
1= Data for the year 2001  
0= Data for all other years, except 2001 
1=  Data for the year 2002 
0= Data for all other years, except 2002 
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Figure 22.  Supplemental Data Analysis: Centrality and Patents 
 
Annual Data Analysis 
1= Data for the year 2003  
0= Data for all other years, except 2003 
1=  Data for the year 2004 
0= Data for all other years, except 2004 
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Figure 23.  Supplemental Data Analysis: Structural Holes and Patents  
 
Annual Data Analysis 
1= Data for the year 1999  
0= Data for all other years, except 1999 
1=  Data for the year 2000 
0= Data for all other years, except 2000 
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Figure 24.  Supplemental Data Analysis: Structural Holes and Patents 
 
Annual Data Analysis 
1= Data for the year 2001  
0= Data for all other years, except 2001 
1=  Data for the year 2002 
0= Data for all other years, except 2002 
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Figure 25.  Supplemental Data Analysis: Structural Holes and Patents 
 
Annual Data Analysis 
1= Data for the year 2003  
0= Data for all other years, except 2003 
1=  Data for the year 2004 
0= Data for all other years, except 2003 
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